餐廳與第三方外送平台之最適合作策略

Abstract

隨著科技與網路平台的發展，人們對於餐飲的消費習慣也逐漸改變，更仰賴外送平台提供的服務，過去研究認為餐廳的利潤會因為外送平台而減少，但平台也可能為餐廳帶來好處，而在此基礎上，本研究探討餐廳如何與第三方外送平台合作。本研究建立一模型，假設市場上存在一家餐廳與兩家不同的第三方外送平台 -- 高品質與低品質的外送平台，餐廳提供餐點給消費者，在權衡外送平台收取的分潤比例，並將一定比例的分潤成本轉嫁給消費者後，餐廳再決定是否與平台合作。最後，消費者會決定內用、使用任一外送平台或不消費。在我們假設的模型參數下，可以得到餐廳與平台的最適合作策略。我們發現，當兩種平台的服務品質皆遠不及內用時，餐廳只會採取內用策略，而當平台的服務品質提升後，餐廳才會與平台合作。當兩種平台的服務品質與內用相當，甚至超過內用時，餐廳會優先與高品質的平台合作，若低品質平台希望能與餐廳合作，需要以較低的分潤比例進入市場。

With the rapid development of technology and platforms, people's consumption habits of food are changing, and they rely more on the delivery platforms services. Some of past research indicates that the delivery platforms destroy the restaurant's profitability due to the commissions, but platforms may also bring benefits to the restaurants. On this basis, our research explores how will restaurants cooperate with third-party delivery platforms. This thesis establishes a model, there is a restaurant and two kinds of third-party delivery platforms in the market: high-quality and low-quality platforms. The restaurant provides meals to customers, and the restaurant will decide whether to cooperate with the platform depending on the platform's commission rates, and also the restaurant's pass-through rate to customers. In the end, customers will decide to dine-in, use platform service or buy nothing. Under the model parameters we assume, we can characterize the optimal strategies for the restaurant and platforms. We found that when the service quality of the two platforms is much inferior to dine-in, the restaurant will only adopt the dine-in strategy, and when the service quality of the platforms improves, the restaurant will cooperate with the platform. When the service quality of the two platforms is similar to or even better than dine-in, the restaurant will give priority to cooperating with the high-quality platform. If the low-quality platform expect to cooperate with the restaurant, it needs to the lower commission rate to enter the market.