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標題: | 競爭法非水平結合管制之研究—以巨型平台為中心 A Study on Non-Horizontal Merger Control of Competition Law: Focusing on Large Platforms |
作者: | 鄭宇宏 Yu-Hung Cheng |
指導教授: | 黃銘傑 Ming-Jye Huang |
關鍵字: | 數位平台,巨型平台,結合管制,動態競爭,新生事業,殺手併購, digital platforms,large platforms,merger control,dynamic competition,nascent firms,killer acquisitions, |
出版年 : | 2023 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 在數位平台經濟的時代,網路效應、大數據及演算法的優勢,造就了巨型數位平台的興起。數位市場集中度高,平台生態系龐大且跨域整合,且市場上有眾多剛起步的新生事業,以研發新創技術、推行新產品進入市場為目的,與既有平台事業間並不具直接競爭關係。頗受質疑之處在於既有平台廣泛地從事垂直及多角化結合,包含收購許多新生事業,可能阻礙、消滅新生事業競爭而減損創新,卻礙於申報門檻、實體審查規範等,這些結合均沒有受到執法機關嚴格審視,引起了結合管制是否錯放的問題。
本文回顧歐美結合管制學理及實務,認為傳統非水平結合管制之理論無法對現實世界個案提出令人確信的預測,且競爭分析缺乏了數位經濟更著重的非價格面向,尤其是動態觀點的競爭分析。其修正方向,關於申報門檻,應朝納入交易價值門檻之方向修正。其次,應提高支配地位平台收購的實體審查標準,判斷被收購的新生事業是否合理可能發展成僅有或少數之顯著競爭對手。關於事後結合管制,在美國法以獨占規範處理新生競爭者收購,具事後取得更多證據的優點,也能檢視系統性收購整體的違法性。最後是救濟措施,除殺手併購外,應運用行為救濟為主,並以確保互操作性為核心。 透過回顧歐美規範,本文建議公平交易法的結合管制規範,應於競爭分析中納入動態觀點,並更重視非價格競爭,維護數位市場競爭秩序並確保消費者享有品質、創新等利益。具體而言,應廢除市占率申報門檻,並考慮於銷售金額門檻外納入交易價值門檻;實體審查部分應將動態觀點納入,判斷垂直、多角化結合是否可能減損現有、未來的創新誘因,以及在判斷重要潛在競爭可能性時應考量數位市場的技術快速變化及技術的未來發展性;在平台事業連續性收購的情形,得透過公平交易法獨占禁止之規範遏止;救濟措施部分應靈活運用,以行為救濟為主,包含強制授權關鍵技術、智慧財產權、限制數據之運用等,以確保互操作性之維持,維護平台市場內的競爭。 In the era of the digital platform economy, network effects and the advantage of big data and algorism have contributed to the rise of large digital platforms. Digital market is high concentration, and platform ecosystems are extensive and cross-sector integrated. There are numerous newly founded start-ups in the market focused on developing new technologies and introducing new products, which do not directly compete with incumbent platforms. The major concern lies in vertical and conglomerate mergers undertaken very often by incumbent platforms, including acquiring many start-ups, which may hinder or eliminate competition from nascent competitors and even undermine innovation. However, due to the flaw of current notification thresholds and merger assessment, only a few of these mergers have been reviewed by competition authorities, raising questions about whether merger control is underenforcement or false negative. The paper reviews theoretical and practical aspects of merger control in Europe and the United States, argues that traditional theories of non-horizontal merger control are unable to provide reliable predictions for real-world cases. Moreover, competition analysis lacks emphasis on the non-price aspects, particularly the dynamic competition analysis. The suggested directions for reform are as follows: First, regarding notification thresholds, it should be revised to include transaction value threshold. Second, the substantive standards for acquisitions by dominant platforms should be heightened to determine whether, but for the merger, the acquired nascent firm is the only firm or one of a small number of firms who will reasonably possibly become significant competitors in the near future. Third, regarding ex-post merger control, in the United States, the prohibition of unlawful monopolization is able to assess the acquisitions of start-ups by large platforms ex post, which offers the advantage of obtaining more evidence post-transaction and allows for an examination of overall legality of systematic acquisitions. As for remedies, in addition to prohibiting killer acquisitions, behavioral remedies should be emphasized, with a focus on ensuring interoperability. By reviewing the merger control in Europe and the United States, this paper suggests that merger control regulations under Taiwan Fair Trade Law should incorporate a dynamic perspective and place greater emphasis on non-price competition. This is to maintain competitive order in the digital market and ensure that consumers benefit from quality and innovation. Specifically, it is proposed to abolish market share as notification threshold and consider incorporating transaction value threshold. In terms of substantive merger review, the dynamic perspective should be taken into account to assess whether vertical and conglomerate mergers may lessen existing or future incentive for innovation. When assessing significant potential competition, the rapid technological changes and future development of technology in the digital economy should be considered. In cases of systematically acquisitions by dominant platforms, the prohibition of abuse of monopolistic position under Fair Trade Law is able to address such situation. Finally, flexible remedies should be exercised with a focus on behavioral remedies, including mandatory licensing of crucial technologies or intellectual property rights, and restrictions on specific purpose of the data usage, to ensure the maintenance of interoperability and competition in the platform market. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/88341 |
DOI: | 10.6342/NTU202302093 |
全文授權: | 同意授權(全球公開) |
顯示於系所單位: | 法律學系 |
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