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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 黃銘傑 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.advisor | Ming-Jye Huang | en |
dc.contributor.author | 鄭宇宏 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author | Yu-Hung Cheng | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-08-09T16:37:43Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-11-09 | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2023-08-09 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2023 | - |
dc.date.submitted | 2023-07-25 | - |
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Khan, Commissioner Rohit Chopra, and Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter on the Withdrawal of the Vertical Merger Guidelines. https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/cases-proceedings/public-statements/statement-chair-lina-m-khan-commissioner-rohit-chopra-commissioner-rebecca-kelly-slaughter Federal Trade Commission. (2021). Statement of FTC Chair Lina M. Khan and Antitrust Division Acting Assistant Attorney General Richard A. Powers on Competition Executive Order’s Call to Consider Revisions to Merger Guidelines. https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2021/07/statement-ftc-chair-lina-m-khan-antitrust-division-acting-assistant-attorney-general-richard-powers Federal Trade Commission. (2022). 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(2019) Competition in Digital Technology Markets: Examining Acquisitions of Nascent or Potential Competitors by Digital Platforms, Before the Comm. On the Judiciary S. Comm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights. https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1545208/p180101_testimony__acquisitions_of_nascent_or_potential_competitors_by_digital_platforms.pdf Slaiman, Charlotte. & Stager, Joshua. (2020). Comments on the draft vertical merger guidelines. https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/798-draft-vertical-merger-guidelines/pk_oti_comments_on_draft_vertical_merger_guidelines_022620.pdf Stasi, Maria Luisa & Solidoro, Silvia. (2016). Emerging Trends in US Antitrust and EU Competition Law. ENTraNCE Annual Conference. https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/44186/ENTraNCE_PB_2016_04.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law of the Committee on the Judiciary. (2020). Investigation of Competition in the Digital Market. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-117HPRT47832/pdf/CPRT-117HPRT47832.pdf U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. (2020). Vertical Merger Guidelines. https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/us-department-justice-federal-trade-commission-vertical-merger-guidelines/vertical_merger_guidelines_6-30-20.pdf U.S. Department of Justice. (2020). Justice Department Sues Monopolists Google For Violation Antitrust Laws. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-monopolist-google-violating-antitrust-laws U.S. Department of Justice. (2022). Justice Department Sues Google for Monopolizing Digital Advertising Technologies. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-google-monopolizing-digital-advertising-technologies | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/88341 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 在數位平台經濟的時代,網路效應、大數據及演算法的優勢,造就了巨型數位平台的興起。數位市場集中度高,平台生態系龐大且跨域整合,且市場上有眾多剛起步的新生事業,以研發新創技術、推行新產品進入市場為目的,與既有平台事業間並不具直接競爭關係。頗受質疑之處在於既有平台廣泛地從事垂直及多角化結合,包含收購許多新生事業,可能阻礙、消滅新生事業競爭而減損創新,卻礙於申報門檻、實體審查規範等,這些結合均沒有受到執法機關嚴格審視,引起了結合管制是否錯放的問題。
本文回顧歐美結合管制學理及實務,認為傳統非水平結合管制之理論無法對現實世界個案提出令人確信的預測,且競爭分析缺乏了數位經濟更著重的非價格面向,尤其是動態觀點的競爭分析。其修正方向,關於申報門檻,應朝納入交易價值門檻之方向修正。其次,應提高支配地位平台收購的實體審查標準,判斷被收購的新生事業是否合理可能發展成僅有或少數之顯著競爭對手。關於事後結合管制,在美國法以獨占規範處理新生競爭者收購,具事後取得更多證據的優點,也能檢視系統性收購整體的違法性。最後是救濟措施,除殺手併購外,應運用行為救濟為主,並以確保互操作性為核心。 透過回顧歐美規範,本文建議公平交易法的結合管制規範,應於競爭分析中納入動態觀點,並更重視非價格競爭,維護數位市場競爭秩序並確保消費者享有品質、創新等利益。具體而言,應廢除市占率申報門檻,並考慮於銷售金額門檻外納入交易價值門檻;實體審查部分應將動態觀點納入,判斷垂直、多角化結合是否可能減損現有、未來的創新誘因,以及在判斷重要潛在競爭可能性時應考量數位市場的技術快速變化及技術的未來發展性;在平台事業連續性收購的情形,得透過公平交易法獨占禁止之規範遏止;救濟措施部分應靈活運用,以行為救濟為主,包含強制授權關鍵技術、智慧財產權、限制數據之運用等,以確保互操作性之維持,維護平台市場內的競爭。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | In the era of the digital platform economy, network effects and the advantage of big data and algorism have contributed to the rise of large digital platforms. Digital market is high concentration, and platform ecosystems are extensive and cross-sector integrated. There are numerous newly founded start-ups in the market focused on developing new technologies and introducing new products, which do not directly compete with incumbent platforms. The major concern lies in vertical and conglomerate mergers undertaken very often by incumbent platforms, including acquiring many start-ups, which may hinder or eliminate competition from nascent competitors and even undermine innovation. However, due to the flaw of current notification thresholds and merger assessment, only a few of these mergers have been reviewed by competition authorities, raising questions about whether merger control is underenforcement or false negative.
The paper reviews theoretical and practical aspects of merger control in Europe and the United States, argues that traditional theories of non-horizontal merger control are unable to provide reliable predictions for real-world cases. Moreover, competition analysis lacks emphasis on the non-price aspects, particularly the dynamic competition analysis. The suggested directions for reform are as follows: First, regarding notification thresholds, it should be revised to include transaction value threshold. Second, the substantive standards for acquisitions by dominant platforms should be heightened to determine whether, but for the merger, the acquired nascent firm is the only firm or one of a small number of firms who will reasonably possibly become significant competitors in the near future. Third, regarding ex-post merger control, in the United States, the prohibition of unlawful monopolization is able to assess the acquisitions of start-ups by large platforms ex post, which offers the advantage of obtaining more evidence post-transaction and allows for an examination of overall legality of systematic acquisitions. As for remedies, in addition to prohibiting killer acquisitions, behavioral remedies should be emphasized, with a focus on ensuring interoperability. By reviewing the merger control in Europe and the United States, this paper suggests that merger control regulations under Taiwan Fair Trade Law should incorporate a dynamic perspective and place greater emphasis on non-price competition. This is to maintain competitive order in the digital market and ensure that consumers benefit from quality and innovation. Specifically, it is proposed to abolish market share as notification threshold and consider incorporating transaction value threshold. In terms of substantive merger review, the dynamic perspective should be taken into account to assess whether vertical and conglomerate mergers may lessen existing or future incentive for innovation. When assessing significant potential competition, the rapid technological changes and future development of technology in the digital economy should be considered. In cases of systematically acquisitions by dominant platforms, the prohibition of abuse of monopolistic position under Fair Trade Law is able to address such situation. Finally, flexible remedies should be exercised with a focus on behavioral remedies, including mandatory licensing of crucial technologies or intellectual property rights, and restrictions on specific purpose of the data usage, to ensure the maintenance of interoperability and competition in the platform market. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Submitted by admin ntu (admin@lib.ntu.edu.tw) on 2023-08-09T16:37:43Z No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2023-08-09T16:37:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 謝辭 i
摘要 ii ABSTRACT iv 簡目 vi 詳目 vii 圖目錄 xi 表目錄 xi 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究動機 1 第二節 研究方法與範圍 4 第三節 論文架構 5 第二章 數位平台經濟之發展及其非水平結合議題 6 第一節 數位平台經濟之意義及特性 6 第一項 數位平台經濟之意義 6 第二項 數位平台之特性 8 第一款 多邊性 8 第二款 網路效應 9 第三款 規模經濟 9 第四款 大數據與演算法 10 第五款 多平台使用與轉換成本 11 第三項 小結 12 第二節 數位平台與結合相關之競爭法議題—以巨型平台為中心 13 第一項 平台的垂直整合及單方濫用行為 15 第一款 Amazon零售電子商務 16 第二款 Apple及Google應用程式商店 17 第三款 Google搜尋引擎 18 第四款 Facebook社群媒體 20 第二項 平台的結合議題 21 第一款 平台併購引起的競爭議題概述 23 第二款 平台的併購策略對結合規範之啟示 29 第三項 小結 35 第三章 非水平結合理論之發展及其對數位平台經濟之因應 38 第一節 非水平結合理論及規範之演變—以美國法為中心 38 第一項 1950-1970年的垂直封鎖及潛在競爭理論 40 第一款 垂直結合及垂直封鎖理論 41 第二款 多角化結合及潛在競爭理論 44 第三款 小結 47 第二項 芝加哥學的興起及後芝加哥學派的修正 48 第一款 芝加哥學派之興起及其批判 48 第二款 後芝加哥學派的新觀點及影響 53 第三項 近期法院見解及行政機關準則之修訂 59 第一款 AT&T與Time Warner結合案 59 第二款 2020年司法部與聯邦交易委員會之《垂直結合準則》 67 第四項 小結 76 第二節 數位平台經濟對非水平結合理論的衝擊 77 第一項 傳統競爭分析方法的不足 77 第二項 結合規範及分析方法之修改建議 79 第一款 申報門檻之調整 80 第二款 引入動態觀點的損害理論 80 第三款 舉證責任 83 第四款 救濟措施及事後審查 84 第三項 小結 86 第三節 動態競爭分析—以競爭法中的創新為中心 87 第一項 動態競爭與創新 87 第一款 動態效率與創新 88 第二款 創新與競爭之關聯 89 第二項 結合審查中的創新 92 第三項 數位平台市場納入創新分析之重要性 95 第四項 小結 98 第四節 本章小結 99 第四章 非水平結合管制的動態競爭分析—事前結合審查及事後獨占濫用行為規範之討論 101 第一節 新生競爭與創新 102 第一項 FTC對Facebook之反托拉斯訴訟 102 第一款 概說 102 第二款 背景事實及支配地位認定 103 第三款 競爭分析 105 第四款 本案啟示 109 第二項 新生競爭損害理論 109 第一款 定義 109 第二款 潛在競爭與新生競爭之差異 110 第三款 規範途徑:事前結合審查及事後獨占規範 112 第四款 相反事實分析 114 第三項 小結 116 第二節 將動態競爭分析納入非水平結合規範 118 第一項 概說 118 第二項 結合申報門檻 119 第三項 實體審查 125 第一款 減損上下游競爭事業之創新誘因 125 第二款 排除新生競爭威脅而損害創新 126 第三款 效率考量及合意殺手併購的問題 135 第四款 歐美新生競爭者收購案例探討 137 第四項 小結 141 第三節 以獨占濫用行為規範處理新生競爭者收購 143 第一項 概說 143 第二項 美國《謝爾曼法》第2條之解釋途徑 145 第一款 規範正當性 145 第二款 規範要件 146 第三款 連續性收購 151 第三項 《FTC法》第5條之適用 153 第四項 小結 154 第四節 競爭法的救濟措施 155 第一項 概說 155 第二項 救濟措施的檢討 156 第一款 平台拆分與互操作性 156 第二款 平台開放與禁止自我偏好 158 第三款 數據的授權與運用 160 第四款 智慧財產權或無形技術資產之強制授權 162 第三項 小結 163 第五節 本章小結 164 第五章 歐美法制對公平交易法非水平結合規範之啟示 167 第一節 我國非水平結合規範之演進 167 第一項 公平交易法之結合規範 167 第二項 實務案例發展 168 第一款 垂直結合 169 第二款 多角化結合 171 第三款 整體經濟利益的衡量 172 第三項 小結 173 第二節 公平交易法與數位平台經濟 173 第一項 我國數位平台經濟之結合案 174 第一款 合資新設紅利點數事業結合案 174 第二款 合資新設支付平台事業結合案 175 第三款 合資新設事業經營純網路銀行結合案 176 第二項 公平會之政策方向 177 第一款 數位市場之特性 177 第二款 殺手併購 178 第三款 隱私在結合審查中的角色 180 第三項 小結 180 第三節 公平交易法與歐美法制之比較與評析 181 第一項 結合審查納入動態觀點、更重視非價格競爭因素 181 第二項 事前結合管制之規範途徑 185 第三項 事後結合管制? 189 第四項 靈活運用救濟措施 191 第四節 本章小結 194 第六章 結論 197 參考文獻 201 | - |
dc.language.iso | zh_TW | - |
dc.title | 競爭法非水平結合管制之研究—以巨型平台為中心 | zh_TW |
dc.title | A Study on Non-Horizontal Merger Control of Competition Law: Focusing on Large Platforms | en |
dc.type | Thesis | - |
dc.date.schoolyear | 111-2 | - |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | - |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 王立達;莊弘鈺 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Li-Da Wang;Hung-Yu Chuang | en |
dc.subject.keyword | 數位平台,巨型平台,結合管制,動態競爭,新生事業,殺手併購, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | digital platforms,large platforms,merger control,dynamic competition,nascent firms,killer acquisitions, | en |
dc.relation.page | 219 | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202302093 | - |
dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | - |
dc.date.accepted | 2023-07-27 | - |
dc.contributor.author-college | 法律學院 | - |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 法律學系 | - |
顯示於系所單位: | 法律學系 |
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