運用賽局理論探討中、美南海競合策略之研究: 兼論我國太平島安全

Abstract

自2014年起，中國在南海島礁造島及從事軍事建設，部署雷達陣地、防空飛彈及戰鬥機進駐，引發美國等國家嚴重關切及區域安全緊張，尤其今(2016)年美國與東南亞國家於南海強化聯合軍事演習及軍事部屬，甚至美國航空母艦史坦尼斯號長期進駐南海地區，南海儼然已成全球最危險火藥庫之一；崛起的中國企圖由東海主權延伸至南海，挑戰美國亞太再平衡戰略，南海區域各國因經濟與國家利益等因素，尋求最佳利益策略。其中以南海資源開發、美國自由航行及中國開發島礁軍事化部署爭議最為激烈，另美國戰機、軍艦刻意進入中國所佔島域領海主權內引起區域緊張，研判南海可能產生之變化，因此，本研究運用賽局理論之「囚徒困境」、「懦夫賽局」、「危機邊緣」及「智豬理論」等模式分析中、美南海情勢，研究發現： 一、 中、美兩國南海競合策略中雖從「囚徒困境」賽局出發，但最終確以改變賽局結構(報酬)，使納許均衡移向對自己有利益之位置，惟受限於主、客觀因素，最後還是回到「囚徒困境」賽局模型中，甚至演變成更為緊張的「懦夫賽局」，意外地迫使雙方採取合作策略。 二、 南海競合賽局中，中國強硬派領導機率大於40%時，美國研判將產生戰爭，導致美國不予介入；美國研判中國在溫和派主導下，美國運用強勢聯合軍演聯盟，將迫使中國南海策略做出讓步，均衡組合為(美國威脅，中國維持現狀)，惟「危機邊緣策略」須將威脅強度增至75%以上，始可對中國產生嚇阻作用。 三、 臺灣太平島安全運用「智豬理論」與中國、美國安全共生，對臺灣而言「等待獲取經濟及安全」利益戰術，亦為獲取最大戰略作為。 本研究藉由賽局理論探討中、美南海競合策略及我國太平島安全之最佳策略，建議作為後續研究參考之依據。

Since 2014, China has been on the rush to construct military installations, deploying radar equipment, and fighter jets in the South China Sea. This particular action has triggered the tension not only with the USA, but also surrounding countries. The joint military operations of USA and several countries of the South East Asia in 2016 and the long term stationed of the USS John C. Stennis has heightened the tension even more. The rise of China is taking absolute control of the South China Sea is a challenge to America’s tactical balance in the region. Countries surrounding the South China Sea are also trying to claim a spot on either side for the massive amount of natural resources the lies underneath the region. This thesis offers some analytically suggestions for the study of the South China Sea based on John Von Neumann’s “Game Theory” 1.Although the concurrence policy of America and China both originate from the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Theory, but the final outcome can shake the foundation of the game, however, limited by the factor of subjective and objective opinions, the final result will return to the Prisoner’s Dilemma game model, and it might transform into the Game of Chicken model, thus forcing each to take cooperative measures. 2.According to the co-opetition of the South China Sea, when the hardline leadership of China takes more than 40% control in the country, USA determines an eminent threat of war, forcing the USA to intervene. However if China is under the leader of the moderate factor, American may demonstrate joint military to make China come to concession, achieving “USA threat, China remain status quo”. Only when USA levitate the fringe theory to at least 75%, then can cause deterrence to China. 3.Using the Boxed Pig Theory, Tai-Ping Island of Taiwan, is able to co-exit along side of America and China in symbiosis. For Taiwan, the beneficial strategy of equilibrium in economy and safety act as an approach to get the most out of both countries. Based on the game theories, the study will briefly discuss possible method Taiwan should take against the concurrence policy of America and China. The study will be supported with further data later on.