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Title: | 臺北市人行道維修支出的政治分配-以101-102年為例 An Empirical Study on the Distribution of City Sidewalk Maintenance Outlays in Taipei City during 2012-2013 |
Authors: | Ya-Hui Tang 湯雅惠 |
Advisor: | 王宏文(Hong-Wung,Wang) |
Keyword: | 分配政治,分配行為,臺北市議員,地盤,里長,人行道, distributive politics,sidewalk maintenance outlays,taipei city councilors,village chiefs, |
Publication Year : | 2018 |
Degree: | 碩士 |
Abstract: | 本研究藉由分配政治理論,探討行政機關之分配行為,適逢103年度市長改選,本研究計畫以改選前最近一次的標案為研究標的,查行政機關標案契約是以101年至102年為劃定範圍,故研究範圍以該兩年為限。本研究計畫以「里」為分析單位,分析藍色執政的臺北市政府在實施人行道資源分配至各里時,是否會因政治因素而有所差別。
本研究計畫有幾點發現:首先,執政黨雖為國民黨,但在人行道資源的配置上,對藍色票倉里及綠色票倉里並無明顯的差別待遇,大部分仍是以各里的客觀需求來分配;第二,議員地盤的策略運用,統計結果在第一、第四及第五選區上較有顯著的反應,可見得該選區的市議員,願意對自己的地盤投入更多的資源以求鞏固,這點支持了過去文獻中,政治人物會將資源優先分配給核心選民的結論;第三,第四選區及第六選區內,女性里長的表現似乎更為出色,為該里民爭取到更多人行道的修補面積及經費。 It is routine for city government who allocates sidewalk maintenance outlays to each village. In theory, the ruling party should give appropriate sidewalk resources according to the demands of each administrative region. However, in partical, some loopholes may exist. For example, councilors are likely to provide more sidewalk resources for their stronghold to get extra political benefits. In order to server the public, village chief will also seek more sidewalk maintenance outlays of the city government. This research is base on the theory of distributive politics. The previous studies showed that the ruling party would more likely to give more resource as feedbacks to their stronghold. To use case-study method to find out the distribution behavior of the politician. This study is to verify whether the ruling party actually give more maintenance outlays to the stronghold area by statistic analysis. It is worth noting that both councilors and villiage chiefs are involved in the distribution process. It is worthy to study the behaviors among the three parties. There are several interesting points are found in this research. First, only a few councilors tend to distribute more resources to their stronghold. Secondly, ruling party is not as expected, that they do not distribute more sidewalk maintenance outlays to the stronghold they owned. Thirdly, the objective demands, in the other hands, are the most important reason for the government to detemine where to allocate sidewalk maintenance outlays. In conclusion, in the Taipei City Government, no specific political distribution behaviors are found on the sidewalk maintenance outlays. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/71890 |
DOI: | 10.6342/NTU201804147 |
Fulltext Rights: | 有償授權 |
Appears in Collections: | 政治學系 |
Files in This Item:
File | Size | Format | |
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ntu-107-1.pdf Restricted Access | 2.04 MB | Adobe PDF |
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