吹哨者制度之理論與實踐–以我國金融控股公司及銀行業內部控制及稽核制度實施辦法第34條之2為例

Abstract

本文自吹哨者保護的理論基礎談起，觀察國內現行的吹哨制度是否仍有規範密度及保護不及之處。爬梳美國、英國及日本等外國法制對於金融業吹哨者之保護規定，再進一步檢索外國金融事業之內部檢舉制度，透過借鑒外國立法例與實務之規範情形，希冀可作為國內金控公司及銀行業內部檢舉制度之參考。 對照外國立法例及實務操作，本文再嘗試比較國內16家金控公司之檢舉辦法，進一步瞭解各金控公司建立內部檢舉制度規範是否產生歧異之處，並提出內部檢舉制度在法制規範面與金控公司實務執行可能面臨之相關疑義，提出本文結論與建議︰ 首先，鑑於金控公司及銀行業內控辦法第34條之2第4項第1款及第2款分別有涵攝過廣及定義不明之疑慮，建議金管會應適度限縮受理檢舉案件類型。 其次，金管會應要求金控公司不得僅因檢舉人為匿名或代理他人提出檢舉案件而拒絕受理及調查。至於受理或調查檢舉案件單位，本文建議應優先以稽核單位作為檢舉案件之受理與調查單位，待檢舉制度完善後，則可透過第三方外部機構建立更健全且可信任之檢舉管道，並仿照外國金控公司增訂禁止其他人員刺探吹哨者之身分規定，提高檢舉人之意願。 又為避免金控公司間所制定之檢舉制度歧異，本文同時建議金管會可自行或責成事業公會組織制定檢舉制度範本，再由各金控公司依範本自行訂定相關檢舉辦法，並將內部檢舉制度辦法揭露於官方網站易於接觸之處。 最後，吹哨者保護精神之落實，在相關制度法制化後，更重要的是將「吹哨責任」與「吹哨保護」融入公司治理文化的一部分，期盼吹哨者勇於舉發不法，促進有效發揮除弊及自淨之功能。

Beginning with a presentation of the theoretical basis of whistleblowing system , this thesis considers whether current domestic whistleblowing systems provide appropriate normative density and sufficient protection to whistleblowers. By comparing the whistleblowing systems of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan and exploring the internal whistleblowing systems of foreign financial industries, this thesis will serve as reference for domestic financial holding companies and banking industries by drawing on foreign legislation and practice norms. In addition to foreign laws and practices, the relevant internal rules of 16 domestic financial holding companies are compared, in order to understand the differences between different internal whistleblowing system regulations. In so doing, issues are raised with respect to aspects of the legal establishment and how companies implement whistleblower protection. Finally, the following conclusions and recommendations are presented: First, the Implementation Rules of Internal Audit and Internal Control System of Financial Holding Companies and Banking Industries (hereinafter referred to as “the Implementation Rules”), Article 34-2, paragraph 4, subsections 1 and 2, are too wide-ranging and unclear. It is proposed that the Financial Supervisory Commission (hereinafter referred to as “FSC”) should place a moderate limitation on acceptable types of reporting. Second, the FSC should deny financial holding companies the right to refuse acceptance and investigation solely because a whistleblower has filed an anonymous report or is reporting on behalf of others. With regard to the unit responsible for accepting and investigating reported issues, it is proposed that an internal auditing unit should be given high priority. With a well-developed whistleblowing system in place, third party organizations can provide more robust and trustworthy reporting channels. In line with foreign financial industries, domestic financial holding companies should also prohibit anyone who tries to identify a whistleblower. In order to avoid differences in the whistleblowing systems of financial holding companies, the FSC should promulgate model guidelines or instruct business associations to do so. Based on these model guidelines, financial holding companies can then create their own in-house regulations or guidelines and disclose these on the company’s official website. Finally, following legalization for whistleblowing, it is even more important to integrate “whistleblowing responsibility” and “whistleblower protection” into the culture of corporate governance. This will encourage whistleblowers to report wrongdoing and promote effective use of the functions of rectification