世界起源：史賓諾沙、康德與黑格爾之本體論與內在性及超越性對照關係

Abstract

此論文旨於以史賓諾沙、康德與黑格爾個別本體論去探求世界起源此存有本質與內在性及超越性關係。在哲學體系中，史賓諾沙的本體論一般也被稱為內在平面性(the plane of immanence)，進而呼應黑格爾內在辯證(immanent dialectic)，並且和康德的超越性(transcendence)作為對比。首先，史賓諾沙在《倫理學》(Ethics)與黑格爾《精神現象學》(Phenomenology of Spirit)所建立的本體論呈現的內在性源於不同的前提：即是史賓諾沙認為存有整體(the totality of being)或上帝此絕對無限為單一且不可分割的物質體(Substance)或自然；上帝具無限屬性。但因人類的有限，只能透過表現邏輯(logic of expression) 而非再現，理解心靈及身體此兩種屬性。心靈作為思考模態(mode of thought)和身體作為空間延伸模態(mode of extension) 為單一論(mind-body monism)與身心平行論(mind-body parallelism)，並且相悖於笛卡爾的身心二元論(mind-body dualism)。當當代認知神經科學或情動神經科學普遍採取身心一元論的立場而身心二元論作為形而上命題可廣義解釋離身經驗，史式身心一元論與笛式身心二元論的岐異有其重要意義。此外，史賓諾沙的內在性前提即是物質體的不可分割性(the indivisibility of Substance)，同時呼應愛因斯坦廣義相對論(the general relativity)中的質能不滅定律(mass-energy conservation and conversion)。不同於歐基里德幾何學(Euclidean geometry)的先驗空間(a priori space)或是康德在《純粹理性批判》中以時間及空間必須為先驗的存有條件為前提，史賓諾沙的身體模態理論說明，身體內部中無限粒子(particle)組成與身體外部間的相容性所導向的動靜相對論打破傳統單一直線或固定速率的空間思維（此連續性速率變化所形成的無限小曲率也預期萊布尼茲微積分的發明）；身體作為外部延伸的點線面三維空間和心靈內在意識作為第四維時間相輔相成；換言之，史賓諾沙的模態理論可視為預視愛因斯坦的四維時空連續體(four-dimensional space-time continuum)。同時，黑格爾的《精神現象學》，另名為意識經驗科學(the Science of the Experience of Consciousness)，前提即是存有不能只是物質體；因為物質體的個體性(individuation) A即A此贅言身分無法在辯證法則中完成自我分化(self-differentiation)或成為他者的最大化差異。傳承康德與德國唯心論以能知主體與被知客體在現象界(the phenomena) ，而非物之身的本質界(thing-in-itself in the noumena)的對應關係，黑格爾的《精神現象學》發展從感覺確認、感知到理解，進而透過主奴辯證與否定法則，意識分化為自我意識，並且到達理性作為心智最高能力的階段，相對於康德的《純粹理性批判》(Critique of Pure Reason)中直覺與概念、感知與理解、想像與判斷在先驗時空的架構下形成的綜合先驗(synthetic a prior)，而同時綜合先驗是康德融合牛頓絕對時空觀與萊布尼茲的超知主體(subject of apperception)。當康德的物之身(thing-in-itself)與本質界(the noumena)說明知識經驗的限制，黑格爾的《精神現象學》則強調本體論與知識論的並行發展，並證實理性的無限可能。另外，黑格爾強調人類的集體意識應該是在歷史此現在、過去、未來的後驗時間向度中，並非康德的先驗時間，也不是史賓諾沙的物質自然世界裡，實踐絕對精神(absolute Spirit)或德國唯心論無限知識的目的。綜言之，融合柏拉圖的辯證法(dialectic)、亞里斯多德的目的論(teleology)、史賓諾沙單一內在性(monist immanence)與康德主體的概念，黑格爾企圖彌平本體論和知識論的高低或康德現象與本質的差異。然而，對德勒茲而言，只有史賓諾沙從空間思維開展的平面內在性可打破辯證法的垂直結構；當黑格爾的絕對精神還停留在以人文中心的唯心論或神學的無限大觀點，史賓諾沙的唯物論探究物質、能量、速度和物種等動物行為學的無限小概念與四維時空連續體才是純粹的平面內在性，並藉此開拓不同自柏拉圖到黑格爾唯心論的本體結構思維。因此，存有本體的整體為歷史還是自然、主體還是物質體或樣態、垂直辯證法還是內在性水平等的討論不僅勾勒出「黑格爾主體–辯證邏輯–心靈意識發展」(the Hegelian Subject-logic of dialectic-stages of mind) 與「史賓諾沙實體–表現邏輯–模態」(the Spinozan Substance- logic of expressionism-mode) 此兩種關於時空與因果論的本體論差異，康德的超驗哲學不僅和內在性本體作為對比，其無法再現的本質(noumena)也和黑格爾辯證法的非存有(nonbeing)、史賓諾沙的本質體與二十一世紀的量子力學此探討更高維世界存有的科學哲學(the philosophy of science)有其對照與討論；而當代學者像是達馬西歐(Antonio Damasio)與瑪拉布(Catherine Malabou)，更是著手於史賓諾沙與黑格爾哲學和腦神經科學連結的跨領域研究。本文分為五章：第一章探討本體論與其相關範疇，包含帕米樂蒂斯的存有、整體存有、亞里斯多德的物實體、時間、空間與因果論和方法論上之間的關係。第二章探討黑格爾在《精神現象學》中所闡述的本體論、辯證主體的形成、黑格爾辯證法與柏拉圖辯證法的對照，與《科學邏輯》(Science of Logic)中，存有、非存有與生成(being-nonbeing-becoming)的個體化形成等觀念。第三章探討康德在《純粹理性批判》中的本體論、超驗主體的綜合先驗，並對照他與萊布尼茲、牛頓與休謨詮釋主體、先驗時空與因果論的關係與康德實在界與非存有等觀念。第四章探討史賓諾沙在《倫理學》中呈現的本體論，其模態理論與物實體的定義如何催生愛因斯坦廣義相對論與四維時空存有。第五章為總結，回顧史賓諾沙、康德與黑格爾所建構的本體論差異，進而釐清哲學脈絡中，對於本體論、內在性與超越性的相關議題，並簡述三位哲學家如何透過科學哲學的概念影響當代物理學與腦神經科學的研究，並藉此淺論西方哲學與當代科學哲學發展的關係。

This dissertation aims to explicate the genesis of the world in terms of Spinoza’s, Hegel’s and Kant’s ontologies respectively, as Spinoza’s ontology termed as the plane of immanence and Hegel’s ontology known as the immanent dialectic can be the ontological antithesis to Kant’s ontology of transcendence. In terms of the ontology of immanence, the two ontological systems constituted in Spinoza’s Ethics and Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit are conditioned by their different presuppositions that the totality of the Spinozan being is Substance and alternatively the totality of the Hegelian being is Subject. The Spinozan ontological pattern that the absolute as Substance- logic of expression- modes explains how the essence of being comes into existence and the process of individuation. Spinoza regards the totality of being as God, Substance or Nature and the infinitely absolute possesses infinite attributes. Yet because of the inadequate idea, human beings can only recognize two attributes of the mind and the body, namely, the temporal mode of thinking and the spatial mode of extension. Critiquing the Cartesian mind-body dualism, Spinoza’s immanence appeals to mind-body monism and mind-body parallelism. As the mind-body parallelism explains how the body as three-dimensional spatial, external extension corresponds to the mind as temporal dimension of internalized consciousness, the mind-body monism and parallelism explain the four-dimensional space-time continuum in Einstein’s general relativity. Breaking with the Euclidian a priori space in geometry, Spinoza’s mode theory concerning the composition of infinite particles within and body encounters without explicates how the constant changes of speed ratio caused by the differentiation of speed/change of speed ratio/the infinitesimal determines the logic of expression as varied degrees of power or power series. Yet, synthesizing Plato’s dialectic, Aristotle’s teleology and organism, Spinoza’s monist vision of immanence and Kant’ subject in German idealism, Hegel’s ontological pattern demonstrated as the absolute as Subject-logic of dialectic- stages of mind in Phenomenology of Spirit, also known as the Science of the Experience of Consciousness, explicates how the subject, initiating the knowing experience from the empirical sense-certainty, perception, force and understanding, consciousness differentiating into self-consciousness to its final stage of absolute Spirit, fulfills its maximal identity in ontology and infinite knowing in epistemology of German idealism as Hegel’s correspondence to Kant’s epistemic principle of “synthetic a priori” of intuition and concept, sensibility and understanding, imagination and judgment within the ontological framework of a priori time and space (while Kant also integrates Newton’s a priori/absolute time and a priori/absolute space and Leibniz’s subject of apperception). Yet rejecting Kant’s a priori time, Hegel’s ongoing formation of consciousness of mind evolves with the temporal dimension of history as the realm of collective human consciousness a posteriori, not Spinoza’s world of Nature. However, for Deleuze, while Hegel’s absolute Spirit as the infinitely large in theology still constitutes a vertical, hierarchical ontology, Spinoza’s notions of conatus, mass-energy conservation and conversion, motion and rest, etc. lead to the infinitely small in ethology and constitutes the spatial, horizontal plane of immanence known as the “pure” immanence. Therefore, the dichotomy of Hegelian History and Spinozan Nature, Hegelian Subject and Spinozan Substance, Hegelian vertical dialectic and Spinozan horizontal plane of immanence presents two ontological differences between the Hegelian Subject-logic of dialectic- stages of mind and the Spinozan Substance- logic of expression- modes, and Kant’s transcendental philosophy as the ontology of transcendence presents its ontological difference from Spinoza’s ontology of the plane of immanence and Hegel’s ontology of negative dialectic. As Kantian noumena somehow corresponds to Hegelian nonbeing and designates itself as the un-representable, higher-dimensional reality, it also anticipates the notion of nonbeing in quantum physics, higher-dimensional reality in string theory in the category of the philosophy of science, as Spinoza’s notion of mind-body mode and the indivisibility of one Substance also anticipates Einstein’s mass-energy conversion/conservation and four-dimensional space-time continuum. In general, this dissertation is divided into five chapters: Chapter One accounts for ontology and its convention since Parmenides and Aristotle concerning the totality of being, substance, categories, time, space and causality, etc. Chapter Two analyzes Hegel’s ontology in Phenomenology of Spirit concerning the dialectic subject, immanent dialectic, the triad of being-nonbeing-becoming as primal quality-quantum-second quality in Science of Logic, etc. Chapter Three demonstrates Kant’s ontology and transcendental subject of synthetic a priori in Critique of Pure Reason concerning his connection with Leibniz’s apperception, Hume’s causality of induction, Newton’s absolute time and space, etc. Chapter Four explicates Spinoza’s ontology demonstrated as the triad of substance, attribute and mode in his Ethics, and how Spinoza’s notion of indivisible substance and mode anticipates Einstein’s general relativity and space-time continuum, etc. In Chapter Five Conclusion, I attempt to synthesize Spinoza’s, Kant’s and Hegel’s ontology concerning time, space and causality respectively and briefly accounts for how their ontological systems anticipate modern scientific theories, such as quantum mechanics and neuroscience in the category of the philosophy of science.