修憲界限與防衛性司法審查：比較臺灣、馬來西亞與哥倫比亞

Abstract

在憲政實踐上，可以看到越來越多國家的法院，透過修憲界限作為判決的理由，宣告國會所通過的修憲條文違憲。然而，相較於一般法律而言，對於修憲的司法違憲審查往往會受到更為強烈的挑戰。本論文主要從三個面向凸顯出法院的難題：權限分際、民主正當性、自我保護。正是由於法院必須面臨如此挑戰，本論文將圍繞以下此一核心問題進行開展：究竟是何種制度或非制度性因素，使法院傾向使用修憲界限作為司法判決的論述理由？ 基於此問題意識，本論文嘗試以司法政治的視角，建構一個關於修憲界限的功能性理論。不同於傳統向來將重點放在「修憲界限存否」的應然論爭，本論文則是以「法院」為中心，從現實需求的角度以分析修憲界限的功能意涵，以及法院運用修憲界限的司法策略與風格。在研究方法上，本論文採取比較憲法中的脈絡分析方式，並聚焦在法院為中心的研究視角，挑選了臺灣、馬來西亞與哥倫比亞三個國家的憲法法院或聯邦（最高）法院，作為觀察與分析的對象。此外，本論文也採用了指標性案例的研究方法，選擇了數個具有憲政重要性的修憲司法審查案例。 本論文認為，修憲界限對於法院而言，毋寧扮演了一個相當重要的自我防禦機制，使法院能藉此與政治部門相抗衡。在此意義之下，本論文將此種司法審查稱之為「防衛性司法審查」。由於在現實上，政治部門時常透過修憲的方式，直接或間接地對於法院造成制度風險，而此時修憲界限即可以發揮事前控制或事後修復的功能。為了使修憲界限的防衛性功能得以有效發揮，法院即必須採取若干策略以促進政治部門的遵循。透過比較案例的觀察分析，本論文發現上述三個國家的法院在關於修憲界限的議題上，正是在於回應修憲所產生對於法院的政治風險。臺灣的大法官與哥倫比亞的憲法法院所面對的是政治部門透過修憲進行權力擴張的情形，而馬來西亞的聯邦法院則是必須處理國會於1988年的修憲，所造成對於司法權直接的限制。 此外有趣的是，在對於修憲界限的使用上，上述三個國家的法院則呈現出各自不同的司法策略。若從臺灣的憲政發展的脈絡來看，由於歷經了從威權到民主政治的轉型過程，同時面對逐漸崛起的多元社會，因此，大法官在對於修憲的司法審查上，採取了迎合多數期待的模式，但也同時在判決中呈現出相當謹慎的論述風格。馬來西亞的普通法院雖然在1988年遭到國會修憲的攻擊，然而，受制於競爭式威權下強大的執政政權，以及伊斯蘭教長期的強勢地位，聯邦法院也必須等到近十年才逐漸有挑戰政治部門的機會。因此，在修憲界限的使用上，聯邦法院採取了避重就輕的模式，將重點放在對於個案爭議的規範解釋，亦沒有宣告國會於1988年的修憲為違憲無效。此外，聯邦法院也引用了相當多的外國判例，以強化自身的論述基礎與正當性。相較之下，哥倫比亞憲法法院自1991年設立以來，即快速累積其司法聲望，使得法院即便是面對受到高度支持的Uribe總統，仍展現出積極創造的回應態度。不過值得注意的是，憲法法院並未試圖在單一案件中，即以一錘定音的方式表示法院的立場，而是採取漸進主義的模式與政治部門進行互動。

Recently, the idea of “unconstitutional constitutional amendment” or “constitutional unamendability” has been discussed worldwide, especially in response to the rise of populism. It can be observed that domestic courts are more likely to strike down constitutional amendments. Interestingly, however, such judicial practice has been questioned on both legitimacy and capacity of the judiciary to invalidate constitutional amendments. In addition, the use of constitutional unamendability heightens the tension between courts and political branches since constitutional amendments are considered as the “higher laws”. To justify, conventional wisdoms have argued that constitutional unamendability can serve as the safeguard of constitutional democracy to prevent certain essential values from being eroded or compromised. Yet, paying less attention on the “supply side” of understanding, this portrait of constitutional unamendability cannot well capture its function and role in specific social and political contexts. Therefore, this Thesis aims to figure out the underlying factors including both incentives and restraints for the courts to conduct judicial review over constitutional amendments. Concerning the case-selection methodology, this Thesis focuses on three democracies- Taiwan, Malaysia and Colombia. In these countries, judicial review of constitutional amendments can be better understood as “militant judicial review”, borrowed from the concept of militant democracy. In this sense, this Thesis suggests that constitutional unamendability can provide institutional protections not only for the constitutional democracy, but most importantly, for the judiciary itself. To elaborate, political branches may seek to expand their power or even directly attack the judiciary through constitutional amendments. In response, militant judicial review is the protective measure or insurance for courts to maintain their political interest, providing both precautionary and restorative solutions. The case studies presented in this Thesis identify three different models of judicial strategy in constitutional unamendability. The Grand Justice of Taiwan represents the “majoritarian model” by striking down constitutional amendments in accordance with the will of political majority. However, the Grand Justice still tried to facilitate constitutional dialogue with both political branches and civil society. The Federal Court of Malaysia represents the “avoidance model” in a context of competitive authoritarianism and the complexity of Islamic issues. The Court has gradually regained its reputation as well as capacity from the 1988 judicial crisis. Yet, the Court mainly devoted itself to heavy interpretive tasks and did not deny the validity of the 1988 Amendment. To compare, the “incrementalist model” shows that the Constitutional Court of Colombia developed its reasoning in a case-by-case manner. Even though the 1991 Constitution empowers the Constitutional Court with strong judicial power however, the Court still took careful steps to review constitutional amendments, especially facing issues related to President Uribe and the FARC.