員工分紅費用化之經濟後果：對研發支出之排擠效應

Abstract

本研究旨在探討員工分紅費用化中以公允價值衡量之規定導致費用化後臺灣上市(櫃)公司股票分紅大幅減少之現象，並造成現金分紅對研發支出之排擠效果。本研究以2002至2012年臺灣上市(櫃)公司為對象，實證結果發現：(1)費用化前公允價值法所造成之可能衝擊愈高之公司，在費用化後其股票分紅減少程度愈大；(2)費用化前利用股票分紅節省現金分紅傾向愈高之公司，在費用化後其現金分紅與研發支出之增額關係為負，且該增額排擠效果會因資金限制較大而更強。此外，上述公司在費用化後大幅減少股票分紅並顯著增加現金分紅與固定薪資、ESO等薪酬型態之比重，並顯著額外增加長期負債。上述發現為股份基礎薪酬促進研發支出之功能提供有別傳統之解釋。

This study investigates the potential impact of measurement of employee stock bonus (ESB) at fair value on the ESB reduction around the implementation of the regulations of mandated expensing of employee bonus (EB), and the crowding out effect of employee cash bonus (ECB) on R&D expenditures following the ESB reduction. By examining the sample of firms in Taiwan ranging from 2002 to 2012, the empirical evidence shows that (1) the potential impact of measurement of ESB at fair value prior to the implementation of the mandated expensing of EB regulations is positively related to the ESB reduction around the implementation of the regulations, and (2) the usage of ESB relative to ECB prior to the implementation of the regulations is positively related to the incremental crowding out effect of ECB on R&D expenditures, and to ECB, wages, employee stock options, and long term debts following the ESB reduction. Furthermore, the incremental crowding out effect of ECB on R&D expenditures is stronger for firms under higher cash flow constraints. These findings provide a different explanation from the traditional view for the role of share-based payments in encouraging R&D.