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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 王泰昌(Taychang Wang) | |
| dc.contributor.author | I-Lin Chen | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 陳以林 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-16T16:14:49Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2022-07-15 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2020-07-15 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2020-05-27 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 中文文獻
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/62916 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本研究旨在探討員工分紅費用化中以公允價值衡量之規定導致費用化後臺灣上市(櫃)公司股票分紅大幅減少之現象，並造成現金分紅對研發支出之排擠效果。本研究以2002至2012年臺灣上市(櫃)公司為對象，實證結果發現：(1)費用化前公允價值法所造成之可能衝擊愈高之公司，在費用化後其股票分紅減少程度愈大；(2)費用化前利用股票分紅節省現金分紅傾向愈高之公司，在費用化後其現金分紅與研發支出之增額關係為負，且該增額排擠效果會因資金限制較大而更強。此外，上述公司在費用化後大幅減少股票分紅並顯著增加現金分紅與固定薪資、ESO等薪酬型態之比重，並顯著額外增加長期負債。上述發現為股份基礎薪酬促進研發支出之功能提供有別傳統之解釋。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This study investigates the potential impact of measurement of employee stock bonus (ESB) at fair value on the ESB reduction around the implementation of the regulations of mandated expensing of employee bonus (EB), and the crowding out effect of employee cash bonus (ECB) on R&D expenditures following the ESB reduction. By examining the sample of firms in Taiwan ranging from 2002 to 2012, the empirical evidence shows that (1) the potential impact of measurement of ESB at fair value prior to the implementation of the mandated expensing of EB regulations is positively related to the ESB reduction around the implementation of the regulations, and (2) the usage of ESB relative to ECB prior to the implementation of the regulations is positively related to the incremental crowding out effect of ECB on R&D expenditures, and to ECB, wages, employee stock options, and long term debts following the ESB reduction. Furthermore, the incremental crowding out effect of ECB on R&D expenditures is stronger for firms under higher cash flow constraints. These findings provide a different explanation from the traditional view for the role of share-based payments in encouraging R&D. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-16T16:14:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-109-D00722001-1.pdf: 1989157 bytes, checksum: 06b12c4647e88f08be372d6dd6271faa (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 目錄
口試委員會審定書 i 誌謝辭 ii 中文摘要 iii 英文摘要(Abstract) iv 第一章 緒論 1 第二章 文獻探討與假說建立 9 第一節 員工分紅費用化之制度沿革 9 第二節 假說一之建立 10 第三節 假說二之建立 12 第三章 研究設計 21 第一節 樣本選取 21 第二節 迴歸模式之建立 22 第四章 實證結果 33 第一節 敘述性統計量 33 第二節 單變量分析結果 34 第三節 多元迴歸分析結果 36 第五章 額外測試 42 第六章 結論與建議 55 第一節 研究結論 55 第二節 研究建議 56 參考文獻 59 附表─樣本選取過程彙總 21 附表─年度分紅統計表 108 附表─變數定義表 109 附錄─員工分紅費用化之正反意見 113 表次 表 次 表1敘述性統計量 66 表2獨立樣本t檢定 67 表3-1模式(1)變數之相關係數矩陣 68 表3-2模式(2)變數之相關係數矩陣 69 表3-3模式(3)變數之相關係數矩陣 70 表3-4模式(4)變數之相關係數矩陣 71 表4模式(1)：公允價值法之可能衝擊對員工股票分紅之影響 72 表5模式(2)：員工分紅費用化對現金分紅之影響 73 表6模式(3)：為因應費用化後現金分紅增加而增加長期負債 74 表7模式(4)：費用化後現金分紅對研發支出之增額排擠效果 75 表8-1資金限制對員工現金分紅排擠研發支出之影響 76 表8-2資金限制對員工現金分紅排擠研發支出之影響(續) 77 表9-1員工分紅費用化對各種員工薪酬型態之影響(Save=SBR) 78 表9-2員工分紅費用化對各種員工薪酬型態之影響(Save=RNK) 79 表10費用化後現金分紅對長期負債比率之影響 80 表11費用化後認股權酬勞對現金分紅之影響 81 表12以工具變數和GMM進行模式(4)之迴歸分析結果 82 表13模式(1)：公允價值法對員工股票分紅帳面值之影響 83 表14模式(1)：公允價值法對調整後股票分紅市值之影響 84 表15-1以Save_ESO進行模式(2)之迴歸分析結果 85 表15-2以Save_ESO進行模式(3)之迴歸分析結果 86 表15-3以Save_ESO進行模式(4)之迴歸分析結果 87 表16-1以Tobit Model進行模式(1)之迴歸分析結果 88 表16-2以Tobit Model進行模式(2)之迴歸分析結果 89 表16-3以Tobit Model進行模式(3)之迴歸分析結果 90 表16-4以Tobit Model進行模式(4)之迴歸分析結果 91 表17-1雙重控制公司與年度個別影響時模式(1)之係數顯著性 92 表17-2雙重控制公司與年度個別影響時模式(2)之係數顯著性 93 表17-3雙重控制公司與年度個別影響時模式(3)之係數顯著性 94 表17-4雙重控制公司與年度個別影響時模式(4)之係數顯著性 95 表18-1排除金融海嘯干擾之模式(1)迴歸分析結果 96 表18-2排除金融海嘯干擾之模式(2)迴歸分析結果 97 表18-3排除金融海嘯干擾之模式(3)迴歸分析結果 98 表18-4排除金融海嘯干擾之模式(4)迴歸分析結果 99 表19-1未控制個別年度固定效果之模式(1)迴歸分析結果 100 表19-2未控制個別年度固定效果之模式(2)迴歸分析結果 101 表19-3未控制個別年度固定效果之模式(3)迴歸分析結果 102 表19-4未控制個別年度固定效果之模式(4)迴歸分析結果 103 表20-1控制個別公司與年度固定效果之模式(1)迴歸分析結果 104 表20-2控制個別公司與年度固定效果之模式(2)迴歸分析結果 105 表20-3控制個別公司與年度固定效果之模式(3)迴歸分析結果 106 表20-4控制個別公司與年度固定效果之模式(4)迴歸分析結果 107 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.subject | 員工分紅費用化 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 現金節省觀點 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 股份基礎薪酬 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 排擠效果 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 研發支出 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | crowding out effect | en |
| dc.subject | cash saving perspective | en |
| dc.subject | share-based payment | en |
| dc.subject | expensing of employee bonus | en |
| dc.subject | R&D expenditures | en |
| dc.title | 員工分紅費用化之經濟後果：對研發支出之排擠效應 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The Economic Consequence of Expensing of Employee Bonus: The Crowding Out Effect on R&D Expenditures | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 108-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 博士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 李啟華(Chi-Hua Li),戚務君(Wuchun Chi),陳宗岡(Tsung-Kang Chen),陳業寧(Yehning Chen),廖芝嫻(Chih-Hsien Liao) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 員工分紅費用化,研發支出,排擠效果,股份基礎薪酬,現金節省觀點, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | expensing of employee bonus,R&D expenditures,crowding out effect,share-based payment,cash saving perspective, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 120 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202000861 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2020-05-28 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 會計學系 | |
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