保險議價之理論與實證研究

Abstract

This dissertation, which is divided into two parts, theoretically and empirically investigates effects of ambiguity, risk aversion, and bargaining power on outcomes of insurance bargaining. Specifically, the first part of dissertation “A Cooperative Insurance Bargaining Model with Ambiguity” theoretically analyzes how the optimal insurance contract will be affected by an increase in ambiguity aversion and an increase in ambiguity by studying a cooperative insurance bargaining game with a risk-neutral insurer and a risk-and-ambiguity-averse client. I first show that full coverage is optimal in the presence of ambiguity and that the optimal premium becomes higher because of the introduction of ambiguity. Subsequently, both an increase in ambiguity aversion and an increase in ambiguity are found to raise the optimal premium. The second part of dissertation “Who Obtains more Discount on Insurance Premiums?” uses the data on Taiwanese auto liability insurance for property damage to empirically examine whether an insured’s risk aversion and bargaining power are associated with his/her premium discount ratios. After controlling insured risks and underwriting variables, the results suggest that, on average, both more risk-averse insured (represented by the insured with multiple types of coverage) and the insured with weaker bargaining power (represented by the insured with claim records) obtain significantly lower premium discount ratios.