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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 曾郁仁 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Yi-Chieh Huang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 黃依潔 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-05-15T18:00:22Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2017-01-27 | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-05-15T18:00:22Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2014-01-27 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2014 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2014-01-17 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Reference of Section 1
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Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 50(3), 338-345. [8] Kihlstrom, R. E., Roth, A. E., 1982. Risk aversion and the negotiation of insurance contracts. The Journal of Risk and Insurance 49(3), 372-387. [9] Klibano , P., Marinacci, M., Mukerji, S., 2005. A smooth model of decision making under ambiguity. Econometrica 73(6), 1849-1892. [10] Muthoo, A., 1995. On the strategic role of outside options in bilateral bargaining. Operations Research 43(2), 292-297. [11] Nash, J. F., 1950. The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18(2), 155-162. [12] Ponsati, C., S akovics, J., 1998. Rubinstein bargaining with two-sided iut [13] Quiggin, J., Chambers, R. G., 2009. Bargaining power and efficiency in insurance contracts. The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review 34(1), 47-73. [14] Schlesinger, H., 1984. Two-person insurance negotiation. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 3(3), 147-149. [15] Schmeidler, D., 1989. Subjective probability and expected utility without additivity. Econometrica 57(3), 571-587. [16] Snow, A., 2010. Ambiguity and the value of information. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 40(2), 133-145. [17] Snow, A., 2011. Ambiguity aversion and the propensities for self-insurance and self-protection. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 42(1), 27-43. [18] Treich, N., 2009. The value of a statistical life under ambiguity aversion. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 59(1), 15-26. [19] Viaene, S., Veugelers, R., Dedene, G., 2002. Insurance bargaining under risk aversion. Economic Modeling 19(2), 245-259. Reference of Section 2 [1] Arnold, M. A., 1999. Search, bargaining and optimal asking prices. Real Estate Economics 27(3), 453-481. [2] Bair, S.-T., Huang, R. J., Wang, K. C., 2012. Can vehicle maintenance records predict automobile accidents? The Journal of Risk and Insurance 79(2), 567-584. [3] Brockett, P. L., Golden, L. L., 2007. Biological and psychobehavioral correlates of credit scores and automobile insurance losses: Toward an explication of why credit scoring works. The Journal of Risk and Insurance 74(1), 23-63. [4] Casterella, J. R., Francis, J. R., Lewis, B. L., Walker, P. L., 2004. Auditor industry specialization, client bargaining power, and audit pricing. Audit: A Journal of Practice & Theory 23(1), 123-140. [5] Cohen, A., Einav, L., 2007. Estimating risk preferences from deductible choice. The American Economic Review 97(3), 745-788. [6] Colwell, P. F., Munneke, H. J., 2006. Bargaining strength and property class in offi ce markets. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 33(3), 197-213. [7] De Meza, D., Webb, D. C., 2001. Advantageous selection in insurance markets. RAND Journal of Economics 32(2), 249-262 [8] Derrig, R. A., Tennyson, S., 2011. The impact of rate regulation on claims: Evidence from Massachusetts automobile insurance. Risk Management and Insurance Review 14(2), 173-199. [9] Fang, H., Keane, M. P., Silverman, D., 2008. Sources of advantageous selection: Evidence from the Medigap insurance market. Journal of Political Economy 116(2), 303-350. [10] Harding, J. P., Knight, J. R., Sirmans, C. F., 2003. Estimating bargaining eff ects in hedonic models: Evidence from the housing market. Real Estate Economics 31(4), 601-622. [11] Huang, R. J., Huang, Y.-C., Tzeng, L. Y., 2013. Insurance bargaining under ambiguity. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 53(3), 812-820. [12] Kihlstrom, R. E., Roth, A. E., 1982. Risk aversion and the negotiation of insurance contracts. The Journal of Risk and Insurance 49(3), 372-387. [13] Li, C.-S., Peng, S. C., 2011. Can auto liability insurance purchases signal risk attitude? International Journal of Business and Economics 10(2), 159-164. [14] Quiggin, J., Chambers, R. G., 2009. Bargaining power and effi ciency in insurance contracts. The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review 34, 47-73. [15] Schlesinger, H., 1984. Two-person insurance negotiation. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 3(3), 147-149. [16] Schmitz, H., 2011. Direct evidence of risk aversion as a source of advantageous selection in health insurance. Economics Letters 113(2), 180-182. [17] Viaene, S., Veugelers, R., Dedene, G., 2002. Insurance bargaining under risk aversion. Economic Modelling 19(2), 245-259. [18] Yavas, A., Yang, S., 1995. The strategic role of listing price in marketing real estate: Theory and evidence. Real Estate Economics 23(3), 347-368. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/5486 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | This dissertation, which is divided into two parts, theoretically and empirically investigates effects of ambiguity, risk aversion, and bargaining power on outcomes of insurance bargaining. Specifically, the first part of dissertation “A Cooperative Insurance Bargaining Model with Ambiguity” theoretically analyzes how the optimal insurance contract will be affected by an increase in ambiguity aversion and an increase in ambiguity by studying a cooperative insurance bargaining game with a risk-neutral
insurer and a risk-and-ambiguity-averse client. I first show that full coverage is optimal in the presence of ambiguity and that the optimal premium becomes higher because of the introduction of ambiguity. Subsequently, both an increase in ambiguity aversion and an increase in ambiguity are found to raise the optimal premium. The second part of dissertation “Who Obtains more Discount on Insurance Premiums?” uses the data on Taiwanese auto liability insurance for property damage to empirically examine whether an insured’s risk aversion and bargaining power are associated with his/her premium discount ratios. After controlling insured risks and underwriting variables, the results suggest that, on average, both more risk-averse insured (represented by the insured with multiple types of coverage) and the insured with weaker bargaining power (represented by the insured with claim records) obtain significantly lower premium discount ratios. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-05-15T18:00:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-103-D97723007-1.pdf: 459805 bytes, checksum: f11be8c6b64f56e3c879c9352c318192 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | Contents
Acknowledgement ii Abstract in Chinese iii Abstract iv 1 A Cooperative Insurance Bargaining Model with Ambiguity 1 1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 1.2 A Cooperative Insurance Bargaining Game . . . . . . . 4 1.3 An Increase in Ambiguity Aversion . . . . . . . . . . 10 1.4 An Increase in Ambiguity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 1.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Reference 16 2 Who Obtains more Discount on Insurance Premiums? 18 2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18 2.2 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 2.3 Data and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24 2.3.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24 2.3.2 Measurement of Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 2.3.3 Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 2.4 Empirical Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28 2.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Reference 33 List of Tables Table 1 Definitions of Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . .36 Table 1 Definitions of Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . .37 Table 2 Summary Statistics of Variables . . . . . . . . . 38 Table 3 Results of the OLS Regression on Premiums . . . . 39 Table 4 Results of the Tobit Regression on Expected Claim Amounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Table 5 Results of the Tobit Regression on Premium Discount Ratios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.title | 保險議價之理論與實證研究 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The Theoretical and Empirical Studies of Insurance Bargaining | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 102-1 | |
| dc.description.degree | 博士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 劉純之,利菊秀,石百達,黃瑞卿,王仁宏 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 保險議價,合作議價,模糊,模糊趨避,風險趨避,議價能力,保費折扣, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | insurance bargaining,cooperative bargaining,ambiguity,ambiguity aversion,risk aversion,bargaining power,premium discount, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 41 | |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2014-01-17 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 財務金融學系 | |
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