台灣上市櫃公司高階經理人薪酬與績效連結性：薪酬委員會之影響

Abstract

Compensation committee is introduced in Taiwanese firms in 2011 for addressing the problem of insensitive compensation. I examine whether mandatory compensation committee increases pay-to-performance relation and whether composition of committee affects pay-performance relation. Using 4,005 firm-years of TSE and GTSM listed firms from 2010 to 2012, I find no significant evidence that compensation committee can improve pay-to-performance relation. But the further test indicates that composition of committee affects pay-to-performance relation. The presence of independent director on compensation committee increases pay-to-performance relation in firms with favorable performance. The result suggests that setting independent directors on committee may be a solution to increase pay-to-performance relation. On the other side, the analysis also indicates that the presence of director with multiple directorships increases pay-to-performance relation. The finding of positive effect of director with multiple directorships supports previous research which stated that director with multiple directorships would bring their experience to board/committee and be more active in participating in board/committee meeting.