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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 林嬋娟 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Li-Rong Chen | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 陳立榕 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-05-15T18:00:01Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2019-03-08 | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-05-15T18:00:01Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2014-03-08 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2014 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2014-01-27 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Anderson, R. C., and Bizjak, J. M. 2003. An empirical examination of the role of the CEO and the compensation committee in structuring executive pay. Journal of Banking and Finance 27 (7): 1323–1348.
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/5475 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | Compensation committee is introduced in Taiwanese firms in 2011 for addressing the problem of insensitive compensation. I examine whether mandatory compensation committee increases pay-to-performance relation and whether composition of committee affects pay-performance relation. Using 4,005 firm-years of TSE and GTSM listed firms from 2010 to 2012, I find no significant evidence that compensation committee can improve pay-to-performance relation. But the further test indicates that composition of committee affects pay-to-performance relation. The presence of independent director on compensation committee increases pay-to-performance relation in firms with favorable performance. The result suggests that setting independent directors on committee may be a solution to increase pay-to-performance relation. On the other side, the analysis also indicates that the presence of director with multiple directorships increases pay-to-performance relation. The finding of positive effect of director with multiple directorships supports previous research which stated that director with multiple directorships would bring their experience to board/committee and be more active in participating in board/committee meeting. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-05-15T18:00:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-103-R00722030-1.pdf: 837760 bytes, checksum: 6dabcdb1320d80dbef79b4b3398b0c7e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 1. Introduction---1
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development---6 2.1. Compensation and Performance---6 2.2. Compensation Committee and Compensation---9 2.2.1. Independence of Compensation Committee---11 2.2.2. Board Overlapping---14 2.2.3. Committee Overlapping---17 3. Research Design---20 3.1. Sources and Sample---20 3.2. Research Design and Empirical Model---22 3.3. Variables Measurement---25 3.3.1. Top Managements Cash Compensation: Dependent Variable ---25 3.3.2. Compensation Committee Variable---26 3.3.3. Control Variables---29 4. Descriptive Statistics and Empirical Results---34 4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Other Analyses---34 4.2. Empirical Results---47 5. Additional Analyses---53 6. Conclusions, Contribution, and Limitations---78 6.1. Conclusions---78 6.2. Contribution---79 6.3. Limitations---80 References---82 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.title | 台灣上市櫃公司高階經理人薪酬與績效連結性：薪酬委員會之影響 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Top Management Pay-to-performance Relation: The Effect of Compensation Committee | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 102-1 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 林孝倫,郭俐君 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 公司治理,薪資報酬委員會,高階經理人薪酬,薪酬與績效連結性, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Corporate Governance,Compensation Committee,Top Management Compensation,Pay-to-performance Relation, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 87 | |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2014-01-27 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 會計學系 | |
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