運氣與社會公正：檢視運氣平等主義

Abstract

本文嘗試從一個當代自由主義的觀點討論運氣、平等與社會公正的概念以及三者之間的觀念連結。運氣就道德而言是任意的，但它能對人們產生實質且重大的影響。因此，如何處置運氣及其效果關係到一種公正理論能否得到證明；尤其是該公正觀念必須能妥當面對運氣所產生的實質不平等。羅爾斯與德沃金皆在其自由平等主義式的公正理論之中緩和運氣的影響，但不要求消除它；另一方面，運氣平等的理念要求使運氣中立化，在它看來這能同時在理論層次實現自由、平等與公正。運氣平等的分配公正觀念根本來說是以某種關於個人選擇或掌控的應得原則為基礎；在此表述中，運氣的排除使每個人得其應得。雖然運氣平等主義在直覺上很有吸引力，本文不能接受這個主張。理由在於，任何的自由行動以及伴隨而來的正當期望都無法以應得原則為基礎，而必須以既定存在的規則為基礎。運氣平等的主張無法同時讓一種公正分配的範式符合應得原則以及自由規則觀念的要求，因此它無法在其分配公正觀念之中調和自由與平等兩種基本價值。

This thesis examines the concepts of luck, equality and social justice, and their conceptual relationship, within the framework of contemporary liberal political philosophy. Luck is morally arbitrary, yet people’s lives can be influenced by it in substantive ways. Therefore a theory of justice must deal with luck and its effect; in particular, the deep inequalities that originated from luck must be treated in a proper manner. The liberal egalitarian theories of Rawls and Dworkin intend to mitigate the effects of luck without neutralizing it. But the basic idea of luck egalitarianism seems to require that luck be neutralized in order to obtain liberty, equality and justice simultaneously. The luck egalitarian conception of distributive justice is primarily based on a principle of desert, which is here defined and embodied in what is within a person’s choice or control: thus what one deserves is indeed defined in the exclusion of luck. In this thesis luck egalitarianism is rejected in spite of its intuitive attraction. It is argued that the principle of desert constitutes at best just one, albeit important, element of justice. In a just society, free actions and legitimate expectations cannot be based on a principle of desert, but have to rely on and to be determined by some existing rules. Luck egalitarianism fails to formulate a pattern of just distribution which is consistent with the principle of desert and a concept of rules at the same time, so it also fails to reconcile liberty and equality, the two fundamental values, in it’s conception of distributive justice.