三邊統制對國際工業合作計畫的影響分析

Abstract

運用政府國外採購之機會，要求得標外商適當回饋國內機構，對此貿易補償行為，我國稱之為工業合作計畫（Industrial Cooperation Program, ICP）。 此貿易行為中之關鍵三方：銷售國企業、採購國政府與其企業間，所扮演之角色各有不同。本研究搜集近20年參與工業合作計畫之國內機構資料，以回收175份之問卷，運用SPSS 12與LISREL 8.71等統計分析軟體，發現： 一、基於對政府政策之瞭解，國內機構即使無法完全掌握外商能力，仍積極參與政府計畫。同時，亦可因此獲得新知，以及與國外企業緊密連結之機會。 二、國內機構面對不確定性最高的國際合作，在政府協助下，幾乎無需給付事前評估成本。此舉，與有交易就有成本的簡約概念，應屬較為新穎的思維。 三、在我國首度實證，三邊統制（trilateral governance）之監督者如為政府單位，則政府為確保政策施行成效，所進行之各項交易防衛措施，幾乎可令全部的國內機構滿意合作結果。 四、在政府積極涉入與強勢輔導下，國內外企業間，若仍發生糾紛，則需政府調處之必要性越高，但調處成效卻非常有限。 五、在我國首度實證，補償互惠可克服雙方交易時，所面臨之資訊不對稱、道德危機與決策時點不一致等困擾。並使參與工業合作計畫之機構，可有效的將合作成果內化，甚至轉成新知與進行管理流程的精進。 因此，政府推動之工業合作計畫，的確可大幅降低國內外企業間之交易成本，但若想促成國內外企業間之夥伴關係，則仍有待國內企業更加主動積極的提高與跨國企業之溝通品質，在建立彼此之互信基礎下，才有機會提升本身之競爭力。

A trading offset transaction in which a foreign contractor is obliged to feed back the domestic companies in return for its successful business bidding under an overseas government procurement project is known as Industrial Cooperation Program (ICP) in Taiwan. This activity involves three parties, namely, the foreign contractor, the government and the domestic companies. A questionnaire survey was conducted in this study to collect the data of domestic organizations that have been engaged in the ICP over the last 20 years. In total, 175 copies of the questionnaire were returned. According to a statistical analysis of the collected data with the software programs of SPSS 12 and LISREL 8.71, this study has found: 1. Even if a domestic organization fails to have a full comprehension of the capability of a prospective foreign contractor, it can still engage in the ICP with a deep understanding of the government policy. Meanwhile, the ICP helps domestic organizations increase their knowledge and opportunities to be closely connected with the enterprises abroad. 2. In the most complicated model of cooperation between local and overseas enterprises, a domestic organization is expected to pay no or little pre-assessment cost with the support of the government. In contrast to a general theory of any transaction entailing costs, this process requires a new way of thinking. 3. It has been empirically shown first in Taiwan that enterprises can enjoy a satisfactory business partnership if the government which takes every transaction defensive measure to ensure the performance of its policy is acting as a supervisor of the trilateral governance business cooperation. 4. It is essential for the government to intervene to resolve disputes between a domestic organization and a foreign contractor under the framework of ICP. However, such government intervention generally achieves limited cooperative effectiveness. 5. It has been empirically confirmed first in Taiwan that offsets can overcome concerns arising from information asymmetry, ethical risks and inconsistent timing of decisions in a transaction. Most organizations that have been engaged in the ICP can have their cooperative results effectively internalized and transformed into their system of operations and management. Accordingly, while domestic enterprises involved in the ICP considerably reduce their costs for business transactions with foreign contractors, they are expected to improve their communicative proficiency in order to consolidate such partnerships. Finally, it is only on the basis of mutual trust can a domestic organization raise its own competitiveness.