台灣車體損失險的訊息不對稱之實證研究

Abstract

本論文透過實證研究來驗證台灣車體損失險市場之訊息不對稱的現象，依循Chiappori與Salanié (2000)的模型，檢定保障高低與理賠的條件相關是否顯著為正，來檢驗訊息不對稱是否存在，並利用每兩月的保單出險資料來區別道德危險和逆選擇的影響。 而在控制車齡來進行檢定之後，本研究發現：在台灣車體險市場上，可能有訊息不對稱現象存在，在甲、乙式對丙式保單上，其條件正相關的趨勢也顯示出車險市場的出險情況是受到逆選擇與道德危險的問題所影響，且整體樣本與新車樣本的分析結果並未有太大差異，表示新車並沒有扭曲市場的訊息不對稱現象。 但控制了出險理賠金額的門檻值後，車齡滿一年但不滿三年的樣本，其條件正相關的程度隨理賠金額提高而下降，而車齡不滿一年的樣本卻反之提高，顯示產險公司對於不同理賠金額的出險案件可能有不同的審核程序或標準。此外，車齡未滿一年的樣本之條件正相關的程度會比車齡滿一年但不滿三年的樣本提早四至五個月就有大幅上升的趨勢，顯示出車齡未滿一年的新車車主對於新車出險的容忍度較低，較不會累積出險至保單到期前才申請理賠的特性。

This study extends Chiappori and Salanie’s (2000) methodology to analyze asymmetric information problems in Taiwan’s automobile comprehensive insurance market. By conditional correlation analysis, we could find evidence to support the existence of asymmetric information problems and classify the effects of moral hazard and adverse selection by using information on timing and numbers of claims in a unique data set. After we control the effect of car age, the empirical findings support the evidence of asymmetric information, and the pattern of positive conditional correlation also shows that both moral hazard and adverse selection would affect the pattern of claims. Meanwhile, our results are robust to the car age. In addition, the subsamples which have car age between one and three years get weaker asymmetric information when the claim amount increases, and those which have car age under one year get stronger one after controlling the effect of claim amount. This result implies that insurance companies may have different standards or procedures of audit for cases of different claim amount. And the conditional correlation of subsample which has car age under one year would increase four or five months earlier than that of subsamples which have car age between one and three years, which implies that the owners of new cars have little tolerance about claims and would not prefer to accumulate the claims to the last two months.