選舉投票之均衡分析-隨機人口模型

Abstract

This paper applies Myerson’s Poisson game to build a model of voting.In the model, the number of population (voters) follows a Poisson distribution, besides, we combine the platform-choosing game between candidates and the game of voting among voters and try to find the sub-game perfect equilibrium. We formally prove that (1) when the population is large, people who actually vote are those who has negative voting cost, which confirms the viewpoint of many economists and thus leave the paradox of voting unsolved. (2) for any platforms chosen by the two candidates, the expected turnout rates for the two candidates are the function of the utility difference of voters who consider the two candidates as the most different, but not the function of the distribution of voters’ type (3) the implementation of median-voter’s favorite platform is efficient .On the other hand, we formally characterize different sub-game equilibriums corresponding to different utility functions of candidates and voters.