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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 楊建成 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Tai-Yu Lin | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 林泰猷 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-13T07:51:05Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2005-07-29 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2005-07-29 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2005 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2005-07-25 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Bendor, Jonathan , Daniel Diermeier and Michael Ting (2003),” The Behavioral Model of Turnout,” American Political Science Review,Vol.97,No 2,261-280
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/36086 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper applies Myerson’s Poisson game to build a model of voting.In the model, the number of population (voters) follows a Poisson distribution, besides, we combine the platform-choosing game between candidates and the game of voting among voters and try to find the sub-game perfect equilibrium. We formally prove that (1) when the population is large, people who actually vote are those who has negative voting cost, which confirms the viewpoint of many economists and thus leave the paradox of voting unsolved. (2) for any platforms chosen by the two candidates, the expected turnout rates for the two candidates are the function of the utility difference of voters who consider the two candidates as the most different, but not the function of the distribution of voters’ type (3) the implementation of median-voter’s favorite platform is efficient .On the other hand, we formally characterize different sub-game equilibriums corresponding to different utility functions of candidates and voters. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-13T07:51:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-94-R91323034-1.pdf: 544383 bytes, checksum: 87986ffbe93a66f5f909293c483d2147 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 1. Introduction…………………………………………………5
2. Literature Review…………...……………………………7 3. Review of Myerson’s Poisson Game …… ……………11 4. The Model…………………………………………………13 4.1 General Setting………………………………………13 4.2 The Basic Model………………………………………16 4.2.1 The Setting………………………………………………16 4.2.2 The Equilibrium…………………………………………17 4.2.3 The Turnout Rate…………………………………………23 4.2.4 Multiple Equilibria………………………………………24 4.2.5 The Robustness of equilibrium…………………………25 4.2.6 Full Turnout Equilibrium…………………………………27 5. The First Stage Game……………………………………31 6. Extensions………………………………………………43 6.1 Randomness of Voting Cost ………………………43 6.2 Multidimensional Space of the Platforms and Voter Types………………………………………48 6.3 General Voter Utility…………………………………50 6.3.1 The Concavity and Convexity of Voters’Utility Function………………………………………………53 6.3.2 The Bias in Favor of a Candidate………………………55 7. The Connection between Poisson Model and Traditional Binomial Model…………………………………………56 8. Efficiency………………………………………………66 9. Conclusion…………………………………………………70 Appendix……………………………………………………72 Reference…………………………………………………94 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 空間投票 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 投票 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 卜瓦松 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 選舉 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 中位選民 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 隨機人口 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 投票矛盾 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | population uncertainty | en |
| dc.subject | voting paradox | en |
| dc.subject | vote | en |
| dc.subject | Poisson | en |
| dc.subject | spatial | en |
| dc.subject | election | en |
| dc.subject | median voter | en |
| dc.title | 選舉投票之均衡分析-隨機人口模型 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | A General Analysis of Voting with Population Uncertainty | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 93-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 宋玉生,羅曉 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 投票,卜瓦松,空間投票,選舉,中位選民,隨機人口,投票矛盾, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | vote,Poisson,spatial,election,median voter,population uncertainty,voting paradox, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 95 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2005-07-26 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 經濟學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 經濟學系 | |
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