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標題: | 經營決策行為與盈餘管理之關聯性研究 Research on the Relationship between Real Activities Manipulation and Earnings Management |
作者: | Yiping Ma 馬依萍 |
指導教授: | 王泰昌,劉嘉雯 |
關鍵字: | 盈餘管理,盈餘門檻,經營決策操縱行為,銷貨操縱,裁決性費用,過度生產,盈餘管理動機, earnings management,earnings threshold,real activities manipulation,sales manipulation,discretionary expense,overproduction,motivation for earnings management, |
出版年 : | 2007 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | This study investigates the relationship between following three kinds of real activities manipulation and earnings management with the purpose of avoiding losses. These three kinds of real activities manipulation are: (1) sales manipulation, (2) reduction of discretionary expense, and (3) overproduction. In addition to the above research, this study examines the cross-sectional features of firms in which managers use real activities manipulation to accomplish their earnings targets. There are six features specified in this study: (1) industry membership; (2) earnings management flexibility (3) stock price motivation; (4) bond covenant; (5) stakeholders motivation; (6) institutional ownership.
This study applies the models of normal cash flows, discretionary expenses and production costs from Dechow, Kathari and Watts (1998) and Roychowdhury (2006) to measure the real activities manipulation, and use the pooled cross-sectional approach to detect the firm years which are suspicious for earnings management to avoid annual losses. Based on the samples of public firms in Taiwan from 1996 to 2005, the empirical results are summarized as follow: 1. Managers tend to manage earnings to avoid annual losses through sales manipulation. 2. Managers tend to manage earnings to avoid earnings decreases through reduction of discretionary expense. 3. No statistically significant relationship exists between reduction of discretionary expenses, overproduction and earnings management with the purpose of avoiding annual losses. 4. Firms with debt outstanding, high level of flexibility in earnings management tend to engage in real activities manipulation. 5. Firms with relatively high stock price motivation and reliability on stakeholders in the corresponding industry exhibit evidences of sales manipulation and overproduction. 6. Institutional ownership appears to be more short-term oriented and pressure managers to engage in real activities manipulation. 7. Industrial membership does not appear a statistically significant relationship with real activities manipulation. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/27514 |
全文授權: | 有償授權 |
顯示於系所單位: | 會計學系 |
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