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Title: | 獨立董監事專業背景與自願性財務預測之關聯性 The relationship between professional knowledge of independent director and supervisor and voluntary financial forecast |
Authors: | Chia-Hsin Lin 林嘉欣 |
Advisor: | 林嬋娟 |
Keyword: | 自願性財務預測,獨立董事,獨立監察人,專業背景,準確性, voluntary financial forecast,independent director,independent supervisor,professional knowledge,precision, |
Publication Year : | 2009 |
Degree: | 碩士 |
Abstract: | 我國於2002年2月發布修正之上市上櫃規章,初次引進「獨立董事、監察人制度」,並將董事及監察人之獨立性及專業資格規範正式列入法律規定中;而金融管理監督委員會自2005年1月1日起正式取消強制性財務預測之規定。因此本研究旨在探討,當強制性財務預測規定取消後,若公司加入獨立董事及監察人等被視為良好之公司治理機制後,對自願性財務預測的影響:若董事會及監察人中增列了具備專業知識身分之專家們,是否就能提升其監督之能力,提升財務報導之品質。
本研究將獨立董事及監察人之專業背景詳細區分為:會計專長、財務專長、管理專長以及法律專長等四大類,並由我國上市櫃公司發布自願性盈餘預測之意願以及其準確性之角度,檢視當公司具有不同專業背景之財務專家時,是否對其造成不同之影響,以及何種財務專家之獨立董監事所佔比例越高時,較能發揮監督功效,提升資訊之透明度,使得自願性財務預測之品質越好。 實證結果顯示:一、在發布意願方面,當公司設有獨立董事或獨立監察人時,公司管理當局自願發布財務預測之意願會降低;但當公司董事會中具有法律背景之專業獨立董事或是當具有法律專家之獨立董事佔全部獨立董事之比例越高時,則會提高公司管理當局發布自願性財務預測之意願。二、財務預測準確性方面,當公司設有獨立董事或具有會計專長之獨立董事佔全體獨立董事之比例越高時,公司管理當局所發布之自願性盈餘預測準確度會較低。 Since 2002, Taiwan Stock Exchange and OTC have revised the Criteria for Review of Securities Listings, the Criteria for Review of Securities over-the-counter listings, Listed and over-the-counter corporate governance practice rule, and the securities and exchange law, formally regulating the qualifications and expertise of independent directors and independent supervisors. In addition, Financial Supervisory Commission of Executive Yuan has decided to terminate the regulation of mandatory disclosure of financial forecasts in order to improve the quality of financial forecasts since 2005. This study examines the effect of selecting qualified and professional independent directors and independent supervisors on voluntary financial forecasts. In order to discuss what expertise can improve the quality of financial reports, this study divides professional knowledge into four categories: accounting, financial, managerial, and law. The empirical results show that companies with independent directors or independent supervisors are less likely to issue voluntary financial forecasts. However, managers tend to issue more voluntary financial forecasts when independent directors with law expertise exist on the board or as the percentage of law experts increase among independent directors. In addition, companies with more accounting expertise independent directors tend to issue less precise voluntary financial forecasts. |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/25910 |
Fulltext Rights: | 未授權 |
Appears in Collections: | 會計學系 |
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