《仙后》第二卷的寓言、倫理與主體：精神分析觀點

Abstract

此論文旨在重新閱讀史賓瑟《仙后》第二卷「中道傳奇」，以精神分析的拓樸結構、欲望的倫理，以及無意識主體諸理論，探究史賓瑟在文本中所呈顯的寓言、倫裡、主體三議題。 第二章論述結合穹•懷特曼的寓言傳統追溯、班雅民和谷登•塔思奇的寓言理論和拉康的拓樸結構理論，而整理出三原則：即寓言是詮釋與批評的、辯證的和拓樸節結構的。寓言文本中因而得以激盪兩股非對立之辯證力道，史賓瑟因而得以在寫作的同時或顯或隱的嵌入對表面書寫的批評或拆解。並進一步申論，史賓瑟在「中道傳奇」中以此寓言結構呈現對立抽象概念間的如莫比絲結構中的非對立性辯證，和延展、如一的結構關係。 第三章談論倫理問題。此章主張史賓瑟所呈現的中道所援引的並不僅是亞里斯多德的尼各馬科倫理學，既而承繼其倫理與欲望的對立關係。史賓瑟對中道騎士展現的去除欲望以建立倫理道德的批評，預示了拉康的欲望的倫理—將欲望重置於倫理的場域、倫理即是欲望的結構—以及新宮一成的「小對形即是黃金率」理論所打開的中道的非理性和諧和欲、愛面向。 第四章以文藝復興心理學和精神分析主體和小對形理論為論述基礎，分析史賓瑟所呈現的多種主體結構典範，包含美荻娜的城堡、愛瑪的中道之堡和雅葵紗的安樂窩，以推論出其所欲彰顯的理想主體。並進一步以我和它之間，主體和無意識欲望間的倫理關係理論分析蓋恩和亞瑟所展現的主體困境。 簡言之，此論文意欲彰顯史賓瑟文本的後現代理論潛力和關懷，並期望拋磚引玉以期更多學者投入此尚待探索面向的後續研究。

In this dissertation, I endeavor to reread and reevaluate The Legend of Temperance in Spenser’s The Faerie Queene, bringing to bear Lacan’s theories of the topological structure, the ethics of desire, and the subject of the unconscious to examine three related topics—allegory, ethics and subjectivity. In the second chapter, I combine Jon Whitman’s observations on the traditions of allegory comprising the compositional and the critical and interpretational, Walter Benjamin’s idea of the dialectical potential of allegory and Gordon Teskey’s further elaboration, and Lacan’s theorization of the topological structure, to suggest that Spenser displays three principles in his allegory of temperance: that allegory is interpretational, it is dialectical and it is topological. Spenser is therefore able to both compose and critique, both weave and unweave his own allegory and complicate the conceptual opposites and present their relations as non-oppositionally dialectical as is embodied by the Mobius structure. In the third chapter, Spenserian temperance is evaluated not so much from the frame of Aristotelian ethics, which suffers from the opposition between ethics and eros, as from the ethics of desire proposed by psychoanalysis—which resituates eros back into the domain of ethics and construes ethics as a structure of desire—and Shingu Kazushige’s elaboration on the objet a as the golden mean—which opens up the dimensions of irrational harmony and relation of eros and Agape—are more akin to Spenser’s presentation and critique of an ethics devoid of desire bodied forth by the knight of temperance, specifically in canto vii and canto xii. In the fourth chapter, the Renaissance faculty psychology and Lacan’s theories of the subject and the objet a are introduced, and Spenser’s various models of subjectivity, including Medina’s Castle, Alma’s House of Temperance, and Acrasia’s Bower of Bliss, are analyzed to figure out his conception of the ideal subject. Also, the ethical relation between Ich and Es, the subject and its unconscious desire, is highlighted to revaluate the subject’s predicament demonstrated by Guyon and Arthur in the parlor scene. In sum, this dissertation, as a mere point of departure for a real journey, aims to unveil the postmodern potential and concerns prefigured in Spenser’s poem, which still await full appreciation and further explorations.