Say-on-Pay制度對CD&A可讀性的影響

Abstract

美國股東對薪酬的諮詢性投票制度(Say-on-Pay)係指股東可針對公司前五大高階經理人的薪酬表示贊成或反對，雖然此投票的結果不具約束性，Say-on-Pay納入股東的參與可減少企業擁有權與經營權分離而產生資訊不對稱的現象。本研究主要探討Say-on-Pay制度對股東會說明書(Proxy Statement)上薪酬討論及分析(Compensation Discussion & Analysis, CD&A)可讀性之影響。本研究以S&P 500公司作為樣本，樣本期間分為2007至2009 Say-on-Pay實施前期與2012至2014 Say-on-Pay實施後期，觀察前後期的CD&A可讀性變化。研究結果顯示Say-on-Pay實施後CD&A的可讀性降低，且有越來越難讀的趨勢。考量機構投資人具有外部治理的角色，且其對薪酬揭露的要求比一般投資大眾多，本研究將機構投資人加入額外分析，結果顯示機構投資人持股集中度高或是有較高專注機構投資人(Dedicated Institutional Investor)持股之公司，在Say-on-Pay實施後，其CD&A的可讀性降低之現象更加明顯。

The implementation of Say-on-Pay gives shareholders the right to vote and discuss compensation plans of firms’ top managements. My study investigates the relationship between Say-on-Pay regulations and CD&A (Compensation Discussion & Analysis) readability. I test the change of CD&A readability before and after Say-on-Pay provisions using the S&P 500 companies through the years 2007 to 2009 (pre-SOP), and the years 2012 to 2014 (post-SOP). The result shows that the CD&A readability decreases after the implementation of Say-on-Pay regulations, and there is an increasing trend in the difficulty of CD&A readability throughout my sample years. Moreover, I investigate how institutional investors affect the changes in CD&A readability from pre-SOP period to post-SOP period due to their important roles in shaping companies’ external governance. I find that the decrease in CD&A readability is larger in firms with a higher institutional ownership concentration and more dedicated institutional ownership.