動機與管制因素對美國銀行業實際買回庫藏股之影響

Abstract

從八零年代中期起，庫藏股之買回漸漸成為公司盈餘分派予股東的主要方法之一。過去許多文獻研究公司買回庫藏股的動機，根據研究結果提出許多假說，例如：分配現金流量、透露公司低估的訊息、避免惡意併購、調整公司資本結構、減緩員工與經理人選擇權的稀釋效果等。因為銀行業的特性與政府管制因素，過去庫藏股的相關研究大多排除銀行業於樣本外。因此，基於政府管制因素之影響，本研究即針對美國銀行業，探討其實際買回庫藏股之動機，及是否適用過去文獻提出之假說；而在買回動機上，亦考量了金融業特性，例如資本適足率與資產證券化活動。 本篇論文使用西元1994到2005年之380家美國銀行買回庫藏股之相關資料為研究樣本。實證結果發現，當金融控股公司擁有較多的現金、成長機會較低、出現被併購危機或是較多的證券化活動，則金融控股公司愈可能實際買回庫藏股。

Since the mid-1980s, share repurchases gradually became one important method for firms to distribute free cash flow to shareholders. The prior literatures suggest that firms repurchase shares to distribute excess cash flow, to reveal undervaluation of firms’ stock, to avoid unwanted takeover, to adjust firms’ capital structure, to counter the dilution effects of employee and management stock options and so on. Because the regulatory environment of banking industry is very specific, most researches excluded bank holding companies from their sample data. The main purpose of this study is to examine whether the results of prior literature can apply to bank holding companies, and the impacts of motives and regulations on whether bank holding companies in United States buyback shares. The samples contain 380 bank holding companies, and the sample period starts from 1994 to 2005. The empirical results that bank holding companies having more free cash flows or less investment opportunities, under the threat of hostile takeovers, or with more securitization activities would be more likely to actually repurchase shares.