董事會特性對審計委員會專業背景之影響

Abstract

審計委員會的功能在於監督企業的財報，若企業能夠聘任專業人士擔任審計委員會成員，以更專業的觀點與更獨立的立場來提高財務報導的可靠性。故美國藍帶委員會、沙氏法案及台灣證交法皆增加了審計委員會專業背景之相關規定，以提升審計委員會監督財務報導之功能。 本研究以財會專家比例及專業資格來衡量審計委員會之專業背景，並從代理理論的角度探討董事會特性對於審計委員會專業背景的影響。以台灣2009年底已設置審計委員會的公司作為研究樣本。實證結果符合代理理論之預期:當獨立董事的比例愈高、董事會規模越大、非獨立董事之獨立性愈高以及董事會持股比例很高時，審計委員會之財會專家比例愈高，亦具備較高之專業資格程度。 然而當董事長兼總經理時，代理理論認為董事會將選出較不具監督能力的審計委員會，亦即財會專家比例應愈低，專業資格之程度亦應愈低。但實證結果卻與代理理論的預期相反，而較符合資源依賴理論的說法，也就是當董事長兼任總經理時，董事會願意聘請較多具有會計專長或專業資格的審計委員會成員，透過具備財會專業和產業經驗的獨立董事，獲取關鍵性資源。

Audit committee has the function of monitoring the firm’s controls of financial reporting. The professional background of audit committee enhances its ability of supervising the firm’s reporting reliability. Therefore, Blue Ribbon Committee, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Taiwan Securities and Exchange law require at least one of the audit committee members to be an accounting or financial expert to ensure the quality of financial statements. This study explores two aspects of the audit committee’s professional background: accounting expert and profession eligibility. Based on agency theory, this study analyzes the impact of board characteristics on the professional background of audit committee. Supporting agency theory, the empirical results of this study lead to the conclusions that the percentage of outside directors in the board, board size, the independence of non-outside directors, and board ownership are all positively related to the number of accounting expert in and profession eligibility of audit committee. Second, the larger board tends to select more accounting or financial experts in audit committee. However, against the predication of agency theory, the empirical results of this study show that, when the chair of the board also serves as CEO, there is higher percentage of accounting or financial experts in audit committee.