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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 曾智揚 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Yen-Lin Liu | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 劉衍伶 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-08T05:06:44Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2011-07-07 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2011-06-29 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 一、 中文文獻
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/23649 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 審計委員會的功能在於監督企業的財報，若企業能夠聘任專業人士擔任審計委員會成員，以更專業的觀點與更獨立的立場來提高財務報導的可靠性。故美國藍帶委員會、沙氏法案及台灣證交法皆增加了審計委員會專業背景之相關規定，以提升審計委員會監督財務報導之功能。
本研究以財會專家比例及專業資格來衡量審計委員會之專業背景，並從代理理論的角度探討董事會特性對於審計委員會專業背景的影響。以台灣2009年底已設置審計委員會的公司作為研究樣本。實證結果符合代理理論之預期:當獨立董事的比例愈高、董事會規模越大、非獨立董事之獨立性愈高以及董事會持股比例很高時，審計委員會之財會專家比例愈高，亦具備較高之專業資格程度。 然而當董事長兼總經理時，代理理論認為董事會將選出較不具監督能力的審計委員會，亦即財會專家比例應愈低，專業資格之程度亦應愈低。但實證結果卻與代理理論的預期相反，而較符合資源依賴理論的說法，也就是當董事長兼任總經理時，董事會願意聘請較多具有會計專長或專業資格的審計委員會成員，透過具備財會專業和產業經驗的獨立董事，獲取關鍵性資源。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | Audit committee has the function of monitoring the firm’s controls of financial reporting. The professional background of audit committee enhances its ability of supervising the firm’s reporting reliability. Therefore, Blue Ribbon Committee, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Taiwan Securities and Exchange law require at least one of the audit committee members to be an accounting or financial expert to ensure the quality of financial statements. This study explores two aspects of the audit committee’s professional background: accounting expert and profession eligibility.
Based on agency theory, this study analyzes the impact of board characteristics on the professional background of audit committee. Supporting agency theory, the empirical results of this study lead to the conclusions that the percentage of outside directors in the board, board size, the independence of non-outside directors, and board ownership are all positively related to the number of accounting expert in and profession eligibility of audit committee. Second, the larger board tends to select more accounting or financial experts in audit committee. However, against the predication of agency theory, the empirical results of this study show that, when the chair of the board also serves as CEO, there is higher percentage of accounting or financial experts in audit committee. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-08T05:06:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-100-R98722030-1.pdf: 524478 bytes, checksum: e701961b0d1369b5b561aa1587626b2c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員會審定書 .................................................... I
致謝 ............................................................... II 摘要 .............................................................. III ABSTRACT ........................................................... IV 目錄 ................................................................ V 表目錄 ............................................................ VII 第一章 緒論 ......................................................... 1 第一節 研究背景 ................................................... 1 第二節 研究動機與問題 ............................................. 2 第三節 預期研究貢獻 ............................................... 4 第四節 研究架構 ................................................... 4 第二章 文獻回顧 ..................................................... 5 第一節 代理理論與董事會之監督功能 ................................ 5 第二節 董事會特性 ................................................ 6 第三節 審計委員會之財會專家與專業資格 ........................... 11 第四節 小結 ..................................................... 15 第三章 研究假說 ................................................... 16 第四章 研究設計 ................................................... 21 第一節 樣本選取及資料來源 ....................................... 21 第二節 變數衡量 ................................................. 22 第三節 實證模型及預期實證結果 ................................... 26 第五章 實證結果與分析 .............................................. 30 第一節 樣本之敘述性統計 ........................................... 30 第二節 相關係數分析 ............................................... 33 第三節 迴歸分析結果 ............................................... 36 第六章 敏感性測試 ................................................. 44 第一節 以獨立董事比例進行截段式迴歸分析 ......................... 44 第二節 考慮審計委員會專業背景之實務經驗 ......................... 51 第七章 研究結論與建議 ............................................ 58 第一節 研究結論 ................................................. 58 第二節 研究限制 ................................................. 60 第三節 研究建議 ................................................. 60 參考文獻 ........................................................... 61 附錄一 ............................................................. 67 附錄二 ............................................................. 68 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.title | 董事會特性對審計委員會專業背景之影響 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The Relations between Board Characteristics
and Professional Background of the Audit Committee | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 99-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 廖珮真,林瑞青 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 董事會特性,審計委員會,財會專家,專業資格, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Board Characteristics,Audit Committee,Accounting Experts,Profession Eligibility, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 70 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2011-06-30 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 會計學系 | |
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