行動支付服務之雙邊市場最佳定價策略

Abstract

隨著行動裝置高度滲透人們的日常，近年來金融科技領域最令人矚目的趨勢之一，莫過於「行動支付」。民眾的生活與消費習慣，因多元化新興支付模式的出現而不斷改變。隨著法規陸續放寬及上路，各產業業者開始積極跨足行動支付市場，瞄準了其所帶動的大餅。百家爭鳴的狀態下，目前國內仍未形成完全統一的市場技術和經營模式，尤其是近端支付之應用。面對這競爭日益激烈的新興市場，行動支付業者紛紛嘗試導入不同行動支付技術，並摸索成功的商業策略。因此，本研究致力於分析行動支付近端支付服務之最佳定價策略，為行動支付生態圈相關業者建構有效的商業模式。 行動支付平台可視為連接著商家與消費者的雙邊平台，故本研究採用賽局理論方法，探討網路外部性影響下，採用不同近端技術之行動支付平台的獲利模型。分析結果顯示，在短期策略上，平台實施交叉補貼策略能夠保證獲利：透過補貼消費者，行動支付平台藉由正向同邊網路效應快速累積消費用戶，進而吸引更多商家加入，再藉由向商家抽取每筆交易手續費，讓平台快速發展、穩定獲利。考慮消費者交易頻率隨商家數變化之趨勢，以及平台開發新商家之服務建置成本，交叉補貼之策略仍是最佳獲利模式。在長期策略上，若行動支付平台合作之金融單位分帳比例不高，則平台更加適合實施交叉補貼策略。本研究也討論，若行動支付平台對消費者也能收取每筆交易手續費或進行每筆交易補貼，面對消費者和商家，平台之補貼對象和定價策略為何？研究發現，最佳獲利模型之補貼策略會隨著採用不同近端技術而改變。補貼對象不再限於消費者，商家也能受補貼，而行動支付平台仍能在策略下持續獲利。

Acknowledging the high penetration rate of mobile devices, mobile payment is currently a hot topic and is expected to reach the tipping point of rapid growth. For such a nascent market, a unified business model for successful mobile payment platform is not yet unveiled, especially in proximity payment applications. Players from all industries are trying to adopt different mobile payment technologies and look for corresponding profitable business model. Therefore, we devote this study to investigate the pricing strategy of proximity mobile payment. We hope to make a step forward to understand this promising market for mobile payment executives, financial institutes, and many other players in the ecosystem. Mobile payment serves as a two-sided platform connecting merchants and customers. Hence, we present a game-theoretic model featuring network externality. Our research suggests, at the beginning of the business, the platform has incentives to adopt the “divide and conquer” strategy. Customers are subsidized to adopt the mobile payment service, and then merchants will be attracted to join the platform due to the positive cross-side network externality. After the ignition, the platform then becomes profitable by charging per transaction fees from the merchants. If the consumption frequency is a function of the number of merchants or there is a system installation cost for each merchant, the same cross subsidization strategy is still optimal. In the long run, the cross subsidization strategy is suggested to be applied when the bank is not taking a too high processing fee and leaves sufficient market share to the mobile payment platform. Our research also shows that if the mobile payment platform considers customer-side transaction fee as a new revenue source, it can enhance its profitability. With different mobile payment technologies adopted, the optimal cross subsidization strategy may be to subsidize the merchants rather than customers.