台灣高鐵BOT風險管理之委託代理人研究

Abstract

本研究採用代理人理論之分析，以交易成本和代理成本之角度探討我國公共建設BOT之風險管理，以台灣高速鐵路股份有限公司做為研究個案，驗證當政府規劃高速鐵路建設時交付民間興建並經營然後移轉之代理效率高低並檢討如何提高整個BOT的代理效率。 我國南北高速鐵路係以外包的方法，委託民間建造、經營和管理。因此，本研究主要奠基於Williamson及Eisenhardt所提之交易成本特性及代理人之假設，探討台灣高速鐵路股份有限公司在整個BOT過程中的優劣之處，以及該優劣之處為何成為代理效率之決定因素，和代理問題與風險。主要的研究問題包括了：一、以資產專用性角度探討專業化程度將如何影響高鐵公司之運作，與政府自行興建有何差異；二、以技術層面觀點視之，高速鐵路之所以以BOT模式執行乃取決於交易成本最小化之假定因而產生，由此一特性衡量代理效率是否明顯；三、藉由政府與高鐵公司之互動，如何將交易風險降到最小，使雙方彼此之關係建立在低代理成本模式下進行，提高代理效率。

In 1994,the Legislative Yuan has passed the Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects Act in the purpose of reducing financial expenditure to contract out a great scale of infrastructure to a private sector .This study applies principle-agent theory approach to explain risks between government and a private sector when outsourcing contract has been signed.In this study,the conditions under which transaction cost issues resulting in project delivery are derived.Further,the circumstances under which risks will not provide additional benefit,and what sorts of solution can be considered due to provide the greatest benefit are detailed. Case study, The Taiwan High Speed Rail(THSR) uses Build-Operate-Transfer(BOT) model in delivering services.This study mainly measures what extent of agent efficiency can be present in this BOT project.Hence,based on the transaction cost and agent theory by Williamson and Eisenhardt seperatively,deciding which factor may lead to fail or success in the whole project.Finally,three issues are concerned by this research:how asset specificity affects agent efficiency in the contrast of high speed railway built by government,does it notable if minimum transaction cost become the main factor and how the government interacts with the THSR under the lowest agent cost and reduce risks.The THSR in the case study incurs lots of costs in building and operating phases,and faces financial crises due to renegotiation with banks failed.Conclusions are drawn and extensions are proposed,related to economic and political factors of agent cost.