家族企業對董事會獨立性之弱化影響

Abstract

過去研究指出，公司治理可以達到抑制盈餘管理及提升公司資訊揭露程度之效果，董事會獨立性則為公司治理是否能健全落實的關鍵；然而，我國家族企業董事會家族色彩濃厚，董事會之獨立性容易受到外界質疑，故本研究欲探討家族企業董事會之獨立性是否仍可以有效達到抑制盈餘管理及提升公司資訊揭露程度之效果，其中，本研究以獨立董事占董事會席次比例及董事長未兼任總經理作為董事會獨立性之衡量方式。 實證結果顯示，相較於非家族企業，家族企業董事會獨立性在抑制盈餘管理之效果上皆不彰顯；至於提升資訊揭露程度方面，董事長未兼任總經理亦無法發揮效能；獨立董事則不論是否為家族企業，皆可發揮提升資訊揭露程度的監督職能。

Prior studies have shown that earnings management is less prevalent and the level of information disclosures is more comprehensive when there is a high level of board independence. However, there is less evidence regarding the effectiveness of board independence on earnings management and information disclosures in family controlled companies. Since board of directors is the core mechanism of corporate governance, this study intends to explore whether family control has an impact on the association between board independence and earnings management or information disclosures. In this study, board independence is estimated by two parameters: (1) proportion of independent directors on the board; and (2) the separation between the chief executive officer (CEO) and the board chairman. Empirical results provide evidence that the impact of board independence on earnings management is weaker and CEO nonduality in improving information transparent is less effective in family controlled companies than non-family controlled companies. But the effectiveness of independent directors in improving the level of information disclosure is similar to that of non-family controlled companies.