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http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/16030完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 陳國泰 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Chiao-Hsuan Chen | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 陳喬宣 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-07T17:58:38Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2012-08-17 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2012-08-09 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 一、中文部分
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/16030 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 過去研究指出，公司治理可以達到抑制盈餘管理及提升公司資訊揭露程度之效果，董事會獨立性則為公司治理是否能健全落實的關鍵；然而，我國家族企業董事會家族色彩濃厚，董事會之獨立性容易受到外界質疑，故本研究欲探討家族企業董事會之獨立性是否仍可以有效達到抑制盈餘管理及提升公司資訊揭露程度之效果，其中，本研究以獨立董事占董事會席次比例及董事長未兼任總經理作為董事會獨立性之衡量方式。
實證結果顯示，相較於非家族企業，家族企業董事會獨立性在抑制盈餘管理之效果上皆不彰顯；至於提升資訊揭露程度方面，董事長未兼任總經理亦無法發揮效能；獨立董事則不論是否為家族企業，皆可發揮提升資訊揭露程度的監督職能。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | Prior studies have shown that earnings management is less prevalent and the level of information disclosures is more comprehensive when there is a high level of board independence. However, there is less evidence regarding the effectiveness of board independence on earnings management and information disclosures in family controlled companies. Since board of directors is the core mechanism of corporate governance, this study intends to explore whether family control has an impact on the association between board independence and earnings management or information disclosures. In this study, board independence is estimated by two parameters: (1) proportion of independent directors on the board; and (2) the separation between the chief executive officer (CEO) and the board chairman.
Empirical results provide evidence that the impact of board independence on earnings management is weaker and CEO nonduality in improving information transparent is less effective in family controlled companies than non-family controlled companies. But the effectiveness of independent directors in improving the level of information disclosure is similar to that of non-family controlled companies. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-07T17:58:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-101-R99722024-1.pdf: 383627 bytes, checksum: 6e7f3ebaae60b95eaa51debfb417f15b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 目錄
摘要 I Abstract II 目錄 III 表目錄 IV 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究動機與目的 1 第二節 研究架構 2 第二章 文獻探討 3 第一節 公司治理 3 第二節 董事會獨立性與盈餘管理、資訊揭露 7 第三節 家族企業董事會特色 11 第三章 研究方法 14 第一節 研究假說 14 第二節 研究設計 17 第二節 資料來源與樣本選取過程 30 第四章 實證結果 32 第一節 敘述性分析 32 第二節 相關性分析 36 第三節 迴歸分析 39 第五章 研究結論與建議 45 第一節 研究結論 45 第二節 研究限制 46 第三節 研究建議 46 參考文獻 47 表目錄 表3-1 模型一之樣本選取過程彙總表 30 表3-2 模型二之樣本選取過程彙總表 31 表4-1 模型一之敘述性統計 33 表4-2 模型二之敘述性統計 35 表4-3 模型一之Pearson相關性分析 37 表4-4 模型二之Pearson相關性分析 38 表4-5 模型一之迴歸分析 41 表4-6 模型二之迴歸分析 44 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.subject | 董事會獨立性 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 董事長未兼任總經理 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 家族企業 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 資訊揭露 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 盈餘管理 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 獨立董事 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Independent Directors | en |
| dc.subject | Information Disclosures | en |
| dc.subject | Earnings Management | en |
| dc.subject | Family Control | en |
| dc.subject | Board Independence | en |
| dc.subject | CEO Nonduality | en |
| dc.title | 家族企業對董事會獨立性之弱化影響 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The Dilution Impact of Family Control on Board Independence | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 100-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 林世銘,黃美祝 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 家族企業,董事會獨立性,獨立董事,董事長未兼任總經理,盈餘管理,資訊揭露, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Family Control,Board Independence,Independent Directors,CEO Nonduality,Earnings Management,Information Disclosures, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 53 | |
| dc.rights.note | 未授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2012-08-10 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 會計學系 | |
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