論公司證券詐欺民事責任之合理性—以可歸責性為研究核心

Abstract

證券詐欺民事案例於實務中層出不窮，而除真正不法行為人之外，公司亦常成為原告損害賠償之請求對象。其中，又以一般證券詐欺、財報不實以及公開說明書不實案例為大宗。惟分析實務判決，可以發現公司作為證券詐欺民事責任之被告時，其於個案中究竟應否或為何須為賠償責任負擔，實質上較無具體或更進一步之判斷及討論。然而，公司作為賠償責任主體，其所支出之賠償成本最終將回歸於整體股東為承擔；同時，公司負擔過多責任之結果，亦可能造成真正不法行為人之責任落實減輕疑義。基於以上，公司證券詐欺民事責任負擔是否合理，實為重要之問題。而本文認為，若欲於個案中賦予公司合理之證券詐欺民事責任，則公司究竟是否具監督義務上之可歸責性判斷，應為重要。因此，本文欲於現行法之規範下，分析為何目前對於公司證券詐欺可歸責性之判斷較為欠缺，並提出將公司監督義務之可歸責性考量納入整體責任判斷過程之建議。 而為得出目前實務欠缺公司可歸責性之判斷原因，本文首先檢視公司一般證券詐欺及資訊不實證券詐欺之民事案例，並分析法院對於公司民事責任之判斷與認定過程。其中，本文發現於一般證券詐欺及資訊不實證券詐欺兩種不同類型下，造成整體判斷欠缺公司可歸責性考量之原因並不相同。前者，係由於法院法條選擇適用下，得依民法第28條或公司法第23條第2項規定為公司連帶賠償之認定。後者，則係因證券交易法（下稱證交法）第20條之1及第32條已明文規定發行人之無過失全部賠償責任。基於此，本文先是提出回歸證交法第20條第1項之要件為判斷公司一般證券詐欺民事責任。同時，針對公司主觀要件判斷之難題，將引美國法適用Rule 10b-5時，對於公司證券詐欺主觀意圖判斷之實務發展與學說討論為參考。而最後本文認為美國法學者提出由公司監督義務層面為切入之輔助性考量判斷，係我國未來得參考之方式。亦即，以公司對於不法行為之監督義務執行狀況為考量，進而於現行判斷之基礎上，建立得調整公司主觀要件認定之空間。至於資訊不實證券詐欺，於財報不實及公開說明書不實情形，實則應有不同之討論評價。而針對財報不實之發行人無過失責任，本文認為得考慮將其調整為設有嚴格免責條件之推定過失責任，以使公司可歸責性考量得有判斷之空間，同時亦不至於過度減輕發行人對於財務報告內容之監督義務責任。最後，公開說明書不實類型，因發行人係作為交易當事人，無過失責任本身似即帶有返還其因不實資訊所獲利益之意涵。對此，本文初步認為縱使對於證交法第32條之適用範圍仍有爭執，惟於現行法未修法明確其適用範圍前，尚不宜調整本條之發行人無過失責任規範。 以上，本文嘗試將公司可歸責性之考量納入整體證券詐欺民事責任之判斷過程，惟因民法第28條及公司法第23條第2項作為法人侵權行為責任之依據，其與證交法間之適用關係亦影響整體公司民事責任之負擔。於此，本文提出當公司已為盡職監督義務時，仍適用全部連帶賠償責任規定之反思。同時，本文亦意識到縱使公司已盡職為一切監督義務執行，現階段排除公司連帶賠償責任規定適用之想法，對於被害人救濟仍有衝擊過大之嫌。而學者提出之公司補充責任構想，或許為較緩和之思考方向。綜上所述，期得藉由公司可歸責性之判斷，使公司證券詐欺民事責任之負擔上，得有進一步合理調整之空間。

Civil litigation on securities fraud cases emerges endlessly in practice. Besides the actual wrongdoers, corporations frequently become targets of plaintiffs' claims for damages. Cases involving general securities fraud, financial statement fraud, and misrepresentations in prospectuses. However, analyzing court decisions reveals that when a corporation is a defendant, courts rarely provide specific discussions on whether or why it must bear liability in individual cases. Nevertheless, corporate compensation costs ultimately fall back on the shareholders. Simultaneously, imposing excessive liability on corporations may mitigate the accountability of the actual wrongdoers. Therefore, the justification of corporate civil liability for securities fraud is a critical issue. This thesis argues that to impose justified civil liability on a corporation, determining its culpability is crucial. Through examining current laws and civil cases of general securities fraud and misrepresentation, this thesis analyzes why corporate culpability determinations are lacking and proposes integrating them into the overall liability assessment process. It finds that the reasons causing the lack of corporate culpability differ between general securities fraud and misrepresentation cases. For the former, courts mostly rely on Article 28 of the Civil Code or Article 23, Paragraph 2 of the Company Act to impose joint and several liability. For the latter, under Articles 20-1 and 32 of the Securities and Exchange Act (SEA), the issuer bears strict liability. Accordingly, this thesis proposes returning to the elements of Article 20, Paragraph 1 of the SEA to determine corporate liability for general securities fraud. Addressing the difficulty of determining a corporation’s subjective elements, it references U.S. practical developments and doctrinal discussions on corporate scienter under Rule 10b-5. Ultimately, it suggests that the supplementary framework proposed by U.S. scholars, which infers corporate scienter based on supervisory duty, is a valuable reference for Taiwan. Through this supplementary consideration of corporate supervisory duty, room can be created to adjust the determination of corporate subjective elements within current judgments. Regarding misrepresentation, cases involving financial statements and prospectuses require separate discussion. For misrepresentation in financial statements, this thesis suggests the issuer's strict liability could be adjusted to a presumed negligence liability with strict exemption defense. This provides room to consider culpability without overly mitigating the issuer's supervisory duty over financial reports. Lastly, regarding misrepresentation in prospectuses, since the issuer is a transaction party, strict liability itself appears to carry the implication of restitution for unjust enrichment obtained through misrepresentation. Thus, while it is widely argued that the scope of Article 32 of SEA is overly restrictive, this thesis suggests it may be premature to adjust the issuer's strict liability before amending the law to clarify its application. Ultimately, this thesis attempts to integrate corporate culpability into the liability determination process. However, since Article 28 of the Civil Code and Article 23, Paragraph 2 of the Company Act serve as the statutory bases for corporate tort liability, their interaction with the SEA affects the overall extent of corporate liability. Accordingly, this thesis raises a reflection: should a corporation bear full joint and several liability even after fulfilling its due supervisory duty? While directly excluding joint and several liability when a corporation has fulfilled its duties seems unrealistic at present, the concept of corporate subsidiary liability proposed by scholar offers a moderate alternative. In summary, determining corporate culpability could provide room for further reasonable adjustments to the extent of corporate civil liability for securities fraud.