論僱用人懲罰性賠償責任之理論與實踐

Abstract

我國自民國77年起陸續引進「懲罰性賠償金制度」，雖於定位上仍屬損害賠償之例外規定，然其適用範圍已漸有擴張之勢。在現代社會高度分工、多數活動皆透過受僱人執行之情境下，懲罰性賠償責任是否應及於僱用人，遂成重要之制度問題。 為回應此問題，本文首先回顧懲罰性賠償金制度之歷史發展，並順其脈絡指出制度之核心目的應為「懲罰」與「嚇阻」。接著，就僱用人是否應負擔懲罰性賠償責任，整理並分析了比較法上三種可能之立法模式：完全否定說、代負責任說與自己責任說，並認為完全否定說將過度限縮制度之功能；代負責任說則係以「補償性賠償」之政策邏輯為基礎，難以回應「懲罰性賠償」之可罰性要求。相較之下，強調僱用人須對受僱人之惡意侵權行為亦「有所『涉入』而具不法性」之「自己責任說」，較能契合懲罰性賠償金制度之本質，而美國《侵權行為法整編第二版》（Restatement (Second) of Torts）第909條正為此理念之具體體現，值得作為我國制度設計之參考。 具體制度設計上，鑒於我國目前對懲罰性賠償金仍採特別法例外規範之保守態度，短期內增設僱用人懲罰性賠償責任之一般條款恐與現行體系不合，故本文認為，現階段較可行者仍是於各特別法中，依其制度目的、規範對象與侵害態樣，個別規範僱用人之懲罰性賠償責任，在不造成體系衝擊之前提下，逐步將「自己責任說」之核心理念內化於現行規範中。

Since 1988, Taiwan has gradually introduced the system of punitive damages through various special statutes. Although the system remains an exceptional rule within the remedial framework of damages, its scope of application has shown a trend of expansion. In a modern society characterized by a high degree of division of labor, where most activities are carried out through employees performing their assigned duties, whether punitive damages should extend to employers has become an important policy issue. To address this issue, this thesis first reviews the historical development of punitive damages and, following its trajectory, points out that the main purposes of such damages should be “punishment” and “deterrence.” It then examines whether employers should bear liability for punitive damages by analyzing three major legislative models in comparative law: the complete-denial model, the vicarious-liability model, and the complicity rule model. This thesis argues that the complete-denial model excessively restricts the functions of punitive damages; the vicarious-liability model, grounded in policy considerations underlying compensatory damages, is unable to satisfy the culpability requirement inherent in punitive damages. In contrast, the complicity rule model—which requires that the employer be “involved” in and bear its own misconduct with respect to the employee’s malicious tort—better accords with the nature of punitive damages. The rule set forth in § 909 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts embodies this very concept and warrants consideration in the design of Taiwan’s legal framework. As for the concrete design of the legal framework, given Taiwan’s current conservative approach that confines punitive damages to exceptional provisions in special statutes, introducing a general clause imposing employer liability for punitive damages in the short term may conflict with the existing legal system. Accordingly, this thesis suggests that, at present, the more feasible approach is to specify employers’ liability for punitive damages within individual special statutes—depending on each statute’s purpose, regulatory subjects, and types of harm—so as to gradually internalize the core principles of the complicity rule model into the existing legal syestem without disrupting systemic coherence.