人頭帳戶提供行為之管制研究：以洗錢防制法第22條為中心

Abstract

我國早期審判實務經常以幫助詐欺罪、幫助洗錢罪論處提供人頭帳戶者，致生過度擴張「幫助故意」之疑慮，立法者遂於2023年修訂洗錢防制法第15條之2（2024年修正條次為同法第22條），以「告誡處分」與「無正當理由交付帳戶罪」獨立規制提供帳戶行為。然各項構成要件之解釋與適用於審判實務上仍存在諸多疑慮，有待釐清。至於金融機構於人頭帳戶防制上之義務，則散落於各種法律與法規命令中，有必要加以系統化統合整理。 日本法對於提供人頭帳戶者之管制，可分為「開戶階段」與「取得帳戶後之轉讓階段」：前者以「最高裁平成19年7月17日判決」之見解為重點；而後者則以「東京高裁平成26年6月20日判決」對日本犯罪收益移轉防止法第28條第2項後段之詮釋為核心。至於金融機構之人頭帳戶防制義務，日本法則採取「先行政、後司法」之管制模式，先由行政機關依個案裁量作成改正命令，如違反再以刑罰介入。 本文比較分析日本法後認為，洗錢防制法第22條之告誡制度仍有保留之必要，惟其設計應回歸行政院最初提出之洗錢防制法第15條之2草案思路，移除告誡所附帶之帳戶限制等法律效果，使其回歸行政警示與風險告知之功能。至於刑罰介入，則不宜以「交付三個以上」或「告誡後再犯」作為核心門檻，而應參照日本法，僅以「期約或收受對價」作為高可責性之客觀指標，以兼顧罪刑相當性、可預見性與制度可操作性。另就金融機構之人頭帳戶防制義務而言，我國現行採取「罰鍰」併用「行政指導」之監理模式，已逐步展現降低人頭帳戶之成效，尚無另行參考日本法改採「先行政後司法」模式之必要。

In earlier Taiwanese judicial practice, nominee account provision was often addressed through accessory liability for fraud and accessory liability for money laundering, which in turn raised concerns about an over-expansive interpretation of the “intent to aid.” Against this background, Taiwan amended Article 15-2 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act in June 2023 (renumbered as Article 22 in 2024), creating a distinct regulatory framework for nominee account provision through (i) an administrative admonition disposition and (ii) the standalone offense of providing an account without justifiable reason. Nevertheless, significant uncertainties remain in trial practice regarding the interpretation and application of the relevant elements, warranting further doctrinal clarification. Meanwhile, financial institutions’ obligations relating to nominee account prevention are scattered across multiple statutes and administrative regulations, and therefore require systematic consolidation. In Japan, the regulation of nominee account provision may be analyzed by distinguishing between the account-opening stage and the post-acquisition transfer stage. The former is closely associated with the Supreme Court decision of July 17, 2007, whereas the latter is illustrated by the Tokyo High Court decision of June 20, 2014, particularly its interpretation of the latter part of Article 28(2) of Japan’s Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds. As for financial institutions’ preventive duties, Japanese law adopts an “administration first, criminal enforcement later” approach: the competent authority issues rectification orders on a case-by-case basis, and criminal penalties are triggered only upon non-compliance. Based on this comparative analysis, this study argues that the admonition mechanism under Article 22 of Taiwan’s Anti-Money Laundering Act should be retained. However, its design should return to the Executive Yuan’s original draft of Article 15-2 by removing the legal effects that attach long-term account restrictions, so that admonition functions primarily as an administrative warning and risk-notification tool. With respect to criminal intervention, this study further contends that neither “providing three or more accounts” nor “reoffending after admonition” should serve as the core threshold. Instead, drawing on Japan’s regulatory experience, criminalization should be anchored primarily in the objective indicator of heightened blameworthiness—namely, “promising or receiving consideration”—in order to better satisfy proportionality, legal foreseeability, and institutional operability. Finally, regarding financial institutions’ nominee account prevention obligations, Taiwan’s current supervisory model—combining administrative fines with administrative guidance—has already begun to reduce nominee accounts in practice, and thus does not necessitate a shift to a Japanese-style “administration first, criminal enforcement later” framework.