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請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/101523
完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位值語言
dc.contributor.advisor郭銘傑zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisorJason Kuoen
dc.contributor.author彭詠晨zh_TW
dc.contributor.authorYong-Cheng Pengen
dc.date.accessioned2026-02-04T16:28:04Z-
dc.date.available2026-02-05-
dc.date.copyright2026-02-04-
dc.date.issued2025-
dc.date.submitted2026-01-28-
dc.identifier.citation外文部分
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dc.identifier.urihttp://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/101523-
dc.description.abstract在美中競爭的背景下,科技出口管制已成為近年美國遏制中國科技發展的主要政策工具。然而,第三方國家也成為中國規避美國管制政策之主要管道,此現象不僅凸顯第三方國家在出口管制體系中的關鍵地位,亦反映其在美中競爭的政治立場與選擇。本研究以層級理論(Hierarchy Theory)為基礎,建構科技出口管制層級指數,旨在系統性解釋第三方國家為何以及如何響應美國對中國的科技出口管制政策。本研究主張,與美國層級關係較緊密、政策制定受其影響較深的國家,將更傾向響應美國對中國發起的科技出口管制政策,共同限制中國的科技發展。
本研究採用混合研究法,蒐集2017至2025年間全球共計1,497件科技出口管制政策,透過量化分析檢驗層級理論對第三方國家政策響應行為的效果,並進一步選取德國與澳洲作為個案,分析其政策決策過程中的因果機制。研究發現,當美國出口管制政策所連結的議題能嵌入既有國際建制所形塑的廣義政策脈絡,例如新冠肺炎與俄烏戰爭等情境,此時美國的層級權威可以顯著且穩定地解釋第三方國家的政策響應行為。換言之,與美國層級關係較接近的第三方國家傾向響應美國政策;然而,當美國的管制政策缺乏國際建制支持,層級理論的效果在拜登時期失效。其主因在於第三方國家對中國的高度出口依賴,削弱了層級關係所能發揮的政策驅動效果。同時,拜登政府採取的精準管制策略亦提高第三方國家的響應成本。而前述的量化分析結果與推論,亦在德國與澳洲的個案研究中獲得經驗支持。
本文之研究成果兼具理論、方法與政策三層次貢獻。首先,本文修正層級理論,指出層級權威並非在所有政策情境下皆能有效約束第三方國家的政策行為。其次,本文建構之第三方國家出口管制遵循率資料庫,系統性呈現各國對美國科技出口管制政策的響應樣態,為出口管制研究提供新的量化分析基礎,亦可作為企業評估地緣政治風險與供應鏈配置的重要參考。最後,研究結果顯示中國與第三方國家的經濟整合正在削減美國的層級權威。其政策意涵在於,若美國欲維繫其技術領導地位,其出口管制政策需結合非紅供應鏈的建構,並透過具備成本分攤機制的管制合作安排,以降低第三方國家的政策響應成本。
zh_TW
dc.description.abstractIn the context of U.S.–China competition, technology export controls have become a policy instrument that the United States seeks to constrain China’s technological development. At the same time, third-party countries have emerged as key channels through which China can circumvent U.S. controls, highlighting their strategic position within the export control regime and their political choices to great power competition. Drawing on hierarchy theory, this study develops a Technology Export Control Hierarchy Index to explain why and how third-party countries respond to U.S. export control policies against China.
Using a mixed-methods design, the study analyzes 1,497 technology export control policies adopted worldwide between 2017 and 2025 and complements the quantitative analysis with case studies of Germany and Australia to examine causal mechanisms. The findings show that U.S. hierarchical authority exerts a significant and stable effect on third-party responses when export controls are embedded in broader policy contexts shaped by existing international institutions, such as those related to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia–Ukraine war. By contrast, when export control policies lack such institutional support, the explanatory power of hierarchical authority weakens markedly during the Biden administration, largely due to third-party countries’ high export dependence on China and the increased compliance costs associated with more targeted control strategies.
This study makes theoretical, methodological, and policy contributions. First, it revises hierarchy theory by demonstrating that hierarchical authority does not uniformly constrain third-party countries’ policy behavior. Second, this study constructs an original dataset on third-party countries’ export control compliance, which systematically captures national responses to U.S. technology export control policies and provides a new quantitative foundation for research on export controls. This dataset also offers a useful reference for firms assessing geopolitical risks and supply chain configurations. Finally, the findings show that deepening economic integration between China and third-party countries has eroded U.S. hierarchical authority. The policy implication is that if the United States seeks to maintain its technological leadership, future export control policies should be coupled with the construction of non–China supply chains and institutionalized cooperation arrangements with cost-sharing mechanisms, in order to reduce the compliance costs borne by third-party countries.
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dc.description.tableofcontents謝辭 II
摘要 IV
Abstract VI
目次 VIII
圖次 XII
表次 XIII
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究問題 5
第二章 文獻回顧 6
第一節 國際體系的霸權競爭 6
壹、 霸權穩定論與權力轉移理論 6
貳、 戰爭、國際建制及科技出口管制作為霸權維繫手段 9
第二節 第三方國家的出口管制與跟隨行為 12
壹、 經濟制裁與其實際效果 12
貳、 第三方國家在出口管制體系中的效果與角色 13
第三章 第三方國家響應霸權國出口管制的理論框架 17
第一節 國際關係體系的互動本質 17
第二節 層級秩序的定義與樣態 18
壹、 安全層級秩序 20
貳、 經濟層級秩序 21
參、 科技出口管制的雙重層級特質 22
第三節 科技出口管制的層級體系 23
壹、 從輸出管制統籌委員會(CoCom)到瓦聖納協議(WA) 23
貳、 科技出口管制層級體系—安全與經濟層級的綜合體現 26
第四章 研究設計 27
第一節 研究假設 27
第二節 研究方法與架構 28
第三節 變項設定與操作化 30
壹、 依變項—第三方國家科技出口管制遵循率 30
貳、 自變項—科技出口管制層級 34
參、 控制變數 36
肆、 模型設定與預期結果 38
第四節 資料來源 39
壹、 依變項—第三方國家科技出口管制遵循率 39
貳、 自變項—科技出口管制層級 41
參、 控制變項 41
第五章 分析結果 43
第一節 敘述統計 43
第二節 相關性分析 48
第三節 迴歸分析結果 52
壹、 廣義出口管制政策響應行為 52
貳、 狹義出口管制政策響應行為 56
參、 迴歸分析結果總結 59
第四節 延伸討論 59
壹、 層級理論可一致解釋廣義出口管制政策之原因 60
貳、 層級理論對拜登時期狹義政策的解釋侷限 62
第五節 個案分析 74
壹、 德國 75
貳、 澳洲 78
第六節 小結 80
第六章 結論 82
第一節 研究限制 82
第二節 研究發現與貢獻 83
第三節 研究建議與展望 86
第四節 政策意涵 87
參考文獻 89
附錄 102
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dc.language.isozh_TW-
dc.subject出口管制-
dc.subject美中競爭-
dc.subject層級理論-
dc.subject政策響應-
dc.subject科技圍堵-
dc.subjectExport Control-
dc.subjectU.S.-China Competition-
dc.subjectHierarchy Theory-
dc.subjectPolicy Response-
dc.subjectTechnological Containment-
dc.title美國層級秩序中的政策響應:第三方國家如何回應美國對中科技出口管制zh_TW
dc.titlePolicy Compliance Under the US Hierarchy Order: Why and How Third-Party States Respond to US Technology Export Controls Toward Chinaen
dc.typeThesis-
dc.date.schoolyear114-1-
dc.description.degree碩士-
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee林竣達;賴潤瑤zh_TW
dc.contributor.oralexamcommitteeJiun-Da Lin;Christina Laien
dc.subject.keyword出口管制,美中競爭層級理論政策響應科技圍堵zh_TW
dc.subject.keywordExport Control,U.S.-China CompetitionHierarchy TheoryPolicy ResponseTechnological Containmenten
dc.relation.page117-
dc.identifier.doi10.6342/NTU202600392-
dc.rights.note同意授權(全球公開)-
dc.date.accepted2026-01-30-
dc.contributor.author-college社會科學院-
dc.contributor.author-dept政治學系-
dc.date.embargo-lift2026-02-05-
顯示於系所單位:政治學系

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