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http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/101249| 標題: | 從讓利到施壓:中國對台農產品政策的轉變與地方政治效應研究(2008-2024) From Preferential Treatment to Pressure: China's Agricultural Policy Tools and Their Impact on Local Politics in Taiwan (2008-2024) |
| 作者: | 鄭彥暐 Yen-Wei Cheng |
| 指導教授: | 左正東 Chen-Dong Tso |
| 關鍵字: | 經濟脅迫,中國對臺政策農產品貿易政策工具政策訊號地方政治政治韌性屏東 economic coercion,China–Taiwan relationsagricultural tradepolicy instrumentspolitical signalinglocal politicspolitical resiliencePingtung |
| 出版年 : | 2025 |
| 學位: | 碩士 |
| 摘要: | 本文探討2008–2024年間中國對臺農產品政策工具如何由「經濟讓利」轉向「經濟施壓」,並分析此一轉變在地方層次引發的政治效應及其受限機制。研究以政策工具與政治經濟視角為主軸,結合政策文本分析、貿易與產業脈絡整理,以及屏東芒果產業的深度訪談,建立「政策設計—訊號傳導—地方接收」的分析鏈條,檢視經濟衝擊如何透過政治歸因、媒體框架、社會動員與地方治理網絡被轉譯、削弱或反向放大。
研究發現:第一,政策目標與工具組合出現結構性轉向,從以關稅減讓與市場准入為主的正向激勵,逐步過渡至以檢驗檢疫、非關稅壁壘與突發式單邊限制為特徵的負向約束,政策可預測性下降且政治訊號性上升。第二,經濟施壓在地方層面的效果並非線性,產業依賴度、產品差異化與替代市場可得性會顯著調節衝擊強度;同時,地方政治網絡與農業組織的中介作用常使政策傳導發生偏移。第三,民主制度與公民社會提供制度性緩衝,使政府得以迅速動員資源、社會得以形成集體行動,短期損失亦可能在中長期轉化為品質升級、創新與凝聚力的非預期效果。 本文據此主張:理解兩岸經濟脅迫需把「地方政治韌性」與「訊號傳導的複雜性」納入核心機制,並以地方治理能力與市場多元化作為降低脅迫有效性的關鍵政策路徑。 This study examines how China’s policy instruments toward Taiwan’s agricultural products shifted from economic concessions to coercive pressure between 2008 and 2024, and how such a shift generates (and is constrained in) local-level political effects. Using a policy-instruments and political-economy approach, the research integrates policy document analysis with sectoral trade/industry context and in-depth interviews centered on Pingtung’s mango industries. It develops an analytical chain linking policy design, signal transmission, and local reception to explain how economic shocks are translated, attenuated, or even reversed through political attribution, media framing, social mobilization, and local governance networks. The findings show: (1) a structural reconfiguration of policy objectives and instrument mix—from positive incentives such as tariff preferences and market access to negative constraints characterized by SPS-related scrutiny, non-tariff barriers, and sudden unilateral restrictions—leading to lower predictability and stronger political signaling. (2) The effects of coercion are not linear at the local level; industry dependence, product differentiation, and access to alternative markets materially condition the magnitude of shocks, while local political and organizational intermediaries often distort transmission. (3) Democratic institutions and civil society provide buffering capacity by enabling rapid governmental responses and collective action, which can transform short-term losses into longer-term upgrading, innovation, and strengthened cohesion. The study argues that theories of economic coercion should incorporate local political resilience and the complexity of signal transmission as core mechanisms, and that resilience-building governance and market diversification are pivotal pathways to limiting coercive effectiveness. |
| URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/101249 |
| DOI: | 10.6342/NTU202504808 |
| 全文授權: | 同意授權(全球公開) |
| 電子全文公開日期: | 2026-01-14 |
| 顯示於系所單位: | 政治學系 |
文件中的檔案:
| 檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ntu-114-1.pdf | 2.91 MB | Adobe PDF | 檢視/開啟 |
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