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http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/10052完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 黃奎隆(Kwei-Long Huang) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Ming-Lun Lu | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 呂明倫 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-05-20T20:58:31Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-07-29 | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-05-20T20:58:31Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2011-07-29 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2011-07-26 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 參考文獻
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(2002). Minimization of communication expenditure for seasonal products. Rairo-Operations Research, 36(2), 109-127. [9] Cachon, G. P. (2001). Stock wars: Inventory competition in a two-echelon supply chain with multiple retailers. Operations Research, 49(5), 658-674. [10] Cachon, G. P. (2002). Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts. In S. Graves & T. Kok (Eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science: Supply Chain Management. North-Holland. [11] Cachon, G. P., & Lariviere, M. A. (2005). Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts: Strengths and limitations. Management Science, 51(1), 30-44. [12] Cachon, G. P., & Zipkin, P. H. (1999). Competitive and cooperative inventory policies in a two-stage supply chain. Management Science, 45(7), 936-953. [13] Chang, S. H., & Fyffe, D. E. (1971). Estimation of Forecast Errors for Seasonal-Style-Goods Sales. Management Science Series B-Application, 18(2), B89-B96. [14] Chase, R. P. (2006). Operations Management for Competitive Advantage with Global Cases 11/e. McGraw-Hill. [15] Chen, J., & Xu, L. J. (2001). Coordination of the supply chain of seasonal products. IEEE Transactions on Systems Man and Cybernetics Part a-Systems and Humans, 31(6), 524-532. [16] Choi, S. C. (1991). Price-Competition in a Channel Structure with a Common Retailer. Marketing Science, 10(4), 271-296. [17] Chopra, S., & Meindl, P. (2004). Supply Chain Management. Prentice Hall. [18] Cournot, A. (1838). Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth. (N. T. Bacon, Trans.). New York:Kelley. (Original work published 1960) [19] Dana, J. D., & Spier, K. E. (2001). Revenue sharing and vertical control in the video rental industry. Journal of Industrial Economics, 49(3), 223-245. [20] Emmons, H., & Gilbert, S. M. (1998). Note. The role of returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions for catalogue goods. Management Science, 44(2), 276-283. [21] Giannoccaro, I., & Pontrandolfo, P. (2004). Supply chain coordination by revenue sharing contracts. International Journal of Production Economics, 89(2), 131-139. [22] Lariviere, M., & Porteus, E. (1999). Selling to the Newsvendor (Research Paper 1569). Retrieved from University of Stanford. [23] Marvel, H. P., & Peck, J. (1995). Demand Uncertainty and Returns Policies. International Economic Review, 36(3), 691-714. [24] Mathur, P. P., & Shah, J. (2008). Supply chain contracts with capacity investment decision: Two-way penalties for coordination. International Journal of Production Economics, 114(1), 56-70. [25] Metters, R. (1997). Production planning with stochastic seasonal demand and capacitated production. IIE Transactions, 29(11), 1017-1029. [26] Metters, R. (1998). General rules for production planning with seasonal demand. International Journal of Production Research, 36(5), 1387-1399. [27] Padmanabhan, V., & Png, I. P. L. (1997). Manufacturer's returns policies and retail competition. Marketing Science, 16(1), 81-94. [28] Smith, S. A., & Achabal, D. D. (1998). Clearance pricing and inventory policies for retail chains. Management Science, 44(3), 285-300. [29] Tian, Z., & Xu, C. (2007). Study on supplier pricing model on stackelberg game. Proceedings of the National Nature Science Foundation 70302014. [30] Tsay, A. A. (1999). The quantity flexibility contract and supplier-customer incentives. Management Science, 45(10), 1339-1358. [31] Tsay, A. A., & W. S. Lovejoy. (1999). Quantity-flexibility contracts and supply chain performance. Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, 1(2). [32] Taylor, T. A. (2002). Supply chain coordination under channel rebates with sales effort effects. Management Science, 48(8), 992-1007. [33] Viswanathan, S., & Wang, Q. N. (2003). Discount pricing decisions in distribution channels with price-sensitive demand. European Journal of Operational Research, 149(3), 571-587. [34] Von Stackelberg, H. (1952). The Theory of the Market Economy. London:William Hodge. [35] Voros, J. (1999). On the risk-based aggregate planning for seasonal products. International Journal of Production Economics, 59(1-3), 195-201. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/10052 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 市面上充斥著形形色色的產品,有一類產品具顯著的銷售季節循環稱為季節性商品。季節性產品隨處可見,共同點就是在某個時間裡的銷售量會特別多而形成一個周期性的波動,因此季節性商品可歸類出以下兩大特性:(1)商品需求的波動性大,(2)生命週期短,上下游經常採用一次性買斷的交易模式。
由於以上的特性,零售商面臨了訂購量的問題,若向製造商訂購過多的產品一旦需求達不到預期則會發生虧損,因此為了減少倉管的人事費用以及存貨成本,並且蒐集市場更精確的資訊,而將訂貨時點訂的離銷售旺季越近越好。如此一來,會發生製造商商供貨不及使得零售商無法及時滿足消費者的需求而產生缺貨成本的情形發生。反觀製造商,在淡季因為沒有訂單而讓產能閒置,到了旺季再生產會有當季產能不足而造成缺貨的風險,使其利潤無法達到最佳;倘若製造商在淡季就生產該數量的產品則本身要承擔倉管及存貨成本費用,由此可知上下游之間的利潤彼此是有衝突的。 因此,本文是以製造商的立場在一般決策下比較導入折扣合約設計與增加產能兩個策略在何種情況下增進利潤的表現較佳,提供在不同參數環境下最佳的選擇策略。首先利用Stackelberg的模型建構製造商與零售商的決策行為,接著建立折扣合約模型與產能擴充模型探討三者對製造商利潤的影響。 製造商在淡季提供折扣合約的目的是為了降低因存貨成本造成的利潤損失以及降低產品的單位生產成本,因為價格折扣能誘使零售商在淡季將部分貨品提前取走並且訂定更多的產品。另一個策略為製造商於銷售旺季進行產能擴充,但必須支付擴充的成本,雖然如此,製造商能避免淡季生產的存貨成本負擔也可因為擴充產能後的大量生產而享有規模經濟所帶來的利益。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | A product whose demand takes place only in a specific period of a year is called “seasonal product.” Due to demand uncertainty and the short life, a retailer faces a problem of determining the timing and the quantity of orders. In order to collect more information, retailers prefer to place orders closed to the peak season so that they can avoid the holding cost and therefore minimize demand forecast error. In this case, a manufacturer cannot produce enough products in the peak season due to capacity constraint. However, if the manufacturer prepares production in advance, stocking inventory will become a burden. Therefore, the manufacturer will attempt to circumvent this problem with a more efficient method.
In this research, the manufacturer provides two ways to improve this problem; one is to design a discount contract, and the other is to expand capacity in the peak season. Under a discount contract, the manufacturer will offer a sale discount for every unit of the products sold in the off-peak season to induce retailers to make an early procurement. Capacity expansion in the peak season is a direct method to satisfy demand and also create economies of scale for the manufacturer. Here, we use the concept of Stackelberg game to construct our model under which a manufacturer faces a retailer to determine the optimal production strategy of a seasonal product by comparing the above two methods. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-05-20T20:58:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-100-R98546031-1.pdf: 859854 bytes, checksum: dc19b37c826df75b20d6457dab33355b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員審定書 i
誌謝 ii 摘要 iii Abstract iv 第一章 緒論 1 1.1 研究動機 1 1.2 研究範圍與架構 4 1.3 論文架構 5 第二章 文獻探討 7 2.1 季節性商品(Seasonal Goods) 7 2.2 賽局理論(Game Theory) 8 2.3 供應鏈合約(Supply Chain Contract) 10 2.4 產能(Capacity) 12 2.5 文獻探討小結 13 第三章 模型建構 15 3.1 一般決策模型 20 3.2 靜態價格下折扣合約與產能擴充模型 22 3.3 動態價格下折扣合約與產能擴充模型 26 3.4 本章小結 28 第四章 模型求解與分析 29 4.1 一般決策模型求解 29 4.2 靜態價格下折扣合約與產能擴充模型求解 36 4.3 動態價格下折扣合約與產能擴充模型求解 42 4.4 假設分析 49 4.4.1 一般決策模型 50 4.4.2 靜態價格下折扣合約與產能擴充模型 52 4.4.3 動態價格下折扣合約與產能擴充模型 55 4.5 數值分析 57 4.5.1 靜態價格下製造商最適生產模型 58 4.5.2 動態價格下製造商最適生產模型 59 4.5.3 靜態與動態價格下供應鏈效率 61 第五章 結論與建議 63 5.1 研究結論與建議 63 5.2 研究限制與未來研究 65 參考文獻 67 圖目錄 圖1.1 瑞智99年度月營業收入 1 圖1.2 模型關係圖 6 圖2.1 賽局示意圖 Choi(1991) 9 圖3.1 交易時點決策圖 20 圖3.2 折扣合約下交易時點決策圖 23 圖3.3 產能擴充下交易時點決策圖 25 圖4.1 製造商生產量決策(a) 31 圖4.2 製造商生產量決策(b) 32 圖4.3 製造商生產量決策(c) 32 圖4.4 參數m、h、g分別對製造商決策之影響 58 圖4.5 參數m、h、g分別對製造商決策之影響 59 圖4.6 敏感係數 對製造商利潤影響 60 圖4.7 單期產能( )對零售商(左)與製造商(右)利潤影響 61 圖4.8 單期產能( )對製造商利潤影響 62 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.title | 製造商之季節性商品最適價格折扣與產能擴充策略 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Optimal Pricing and Capacity Strategies for Seasonal Products in a Supply Chain | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 99-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.coadvisor | 郭佳瑋(Chia-Wei Kuo) | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 吳政鴻(Cheng-Hung Wu),余峻瑜(Jiun-Yu Yu) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 季節性商品,Stackelberg模型,折扣合約,產能擴充, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | seasonal products,Stackelberg game,discount contract,capacity expansion, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 70 | |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2011-07-26 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 工學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 工業工程學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位: | 工業工程學研究所 | |
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