地上權關係之繼受人效力

Abstract

所有人與定限物權人之間，並非僅有劃定對物支配權能歸屬、使彼此負不侵害對方物權的不作為義務，尚存在請求對方為一定給付的債之關係。此等伴隨於物權的債之關係，稱作「物上之債」，其或因法律規定而發生（法定），或因物權當事人合意而形成（意定）；其中，意定物上之債經登記後，將使繼受人須受原物權當事人所訂定的約定拘束，而發生「債隨物轉」的現象。奠基於此，本文以土地所有人與地上權人合意形成的債之關係（地上權關係）為研究對象，探討何種地上權關係將依法產生拘束土地所有權或地上權後手的效力（繼受人效力），以及賦予繼受人效力背後的正當性基礎何在。 觀諸物權編普通地上權一節規定，民法第836條第2項、第836條之1、第836條之2第2項與第838條第2項，不論是條文本身或立法理由，均反覆提及「對抗效力」或「物權效力」，以及系爭規範客體經登記將「構成地上權內容」，民法第836條第2項更以「地租約定之物權效力」作為「合併計算地上權前後手欠租數額」與「後手應就前手欠租負連帶清償責任」之正當化依據。實則，民法第836條第2項規範的地租約定、民法第838條第2項規範的地上權處分限制約定及民法第836條之2第2項規範的使用方法約定，性質均為債權約定，經登記將發生繼受人效力，使原物權當事人間的債權約定繼續存在於新物權當事人之間，惟並不會構成物權內容、發生（狹義）物權的對世效力；從而，前揭規定為我國地上權意定物上之債的規定，且分別指向不同的規範意旨。相對於此，民法第836條之1所指「對抗效力」，並非繼受人效力；而民法第836條第2項「合併計算」與「連帶清償」的法律效果，亦無法自繼受人效力本身推衍而出，該等規定對繼受人權益造成的影響是否妥適，應回歸條文規範目的加以探討。 意定物上之債，並無物權法定主義之適用；惟繼受人效力的賦予，係對當事人私法自治與契約自由的干預，故繼受人效力客觀範圍的擴張，須以實定法為基礎，確認立法計劃與現行條文之間存在落差，方得進行法之續造。自地上權意定物上之債規定出發，用益狀態維持約定與違約金約定，均應被賦予繼受人效力。另一方面，民法第425條第1項與第426條之1「法定契約承擔」之規定，同樣帶有「令繼受人受他人訂定之債權約定拘束」的內涵；在土地所有權讓與側，租賃與地上權均係以一定期間的對物用益為目的，立法者於民法第425條第1項「契約承擔」規範模式展現的規範目的，亦應落實於土地所有人與地上權人之間，故客觀上與地上權存續期間土地用益及土地所有權權能相關之地上權關係，得透過民法第425條第1項之類推適用，被賦予拘束土地所有權後手的繼受人效力，且其與地上權意定物上之債規定之（類推）適用，處於自由競合關係。惟在地上權讓與側，因不存在法律漏洞，故並無類推適用民法第426條之1的空間。

The legal relationship between the owner and the holder of a limited property right is not limited to defining the entitlement to control the property and imposing mutual obligations to refrain from infringing each other's property rights. A contractual relationship entitling either party to request specific performance from the other also exists between the owner and the holder of a limited property right. Such relationships of obligations associated with property rights are referred to as “obligations attached to property”. These obligations may arise either by provisions (statutory) or through mutual agreement between the parties to the property rights (contractual). Notably, when contractual obligations attached to property are registered, they bind transferees to the terms agreed upon by the original parties, giving rise to the phenomenon of “transfer of obligations with the property”. Based on the above, this thesis focuses on the contractual relationship formed by agreement between the landowner and the superficiary(“the superficies relationship”), discusses whether this kind of relationship has a binding effect on transferees of the ownership of the land or the superficies, and explores the underlying justification for granting such transferee-binding effects. Examining the provisions under the section of general superficies in the part of rights in rem in Civil Code, Articles 836, Paragraph 2, 836-1, 836-2, Paragraph 2, and 838, Paragraph 2 of Civil Code repeatedly reference terms such as “the effect against a third party” or “real right effect” in both statutory texts and legislative reasons. They also state that those relationships of obligations applying these provisions, once registered, will “constitute the content of the superficies”. Article 836, Paragraph 2 of Civil Code even specifically regards “the real right effect of the agreement of rental” as the justification that the transferor’s unpaid rental should be taken into consideration for the establishment of the ground for termination of the superficies and that the transferee should be jointly liable for the transferor’s unpaid rental. In essence, the agreement of rental under Article 836, Paragraph 2, the agreement of restrictions on the disposition of superficies under Article 838, Paragraph 2, and the agreement on methods of use under Article 836-2, Paragraph 2, are all contractual relationships. Once registered, these agreements acquire the transferee-binding effect, ensuring that these agreements between the original parties to the property right continue to bind the new parties. However, these agreements neither constitute the content of superficies nor possess in remness. Consequently, the aforementioned provisions are regulations for contractual obligations attached to property in Taiwan’s legal framework, each serving distinct regulatory purposes. In contrast, “the effect against a third party” referred to in Article 836-1 does not pertain to the transferee-binding effects. Furthermore, the justification of the two legal effects stipulated in Article 836, Paragraph 2, cannot be derived solely from the transferee-binding effect. Whether the impact of these provisions on the rights of transferees is appropriate should be examined in light of the regulatory purpose underlying the statutory provisions. Contractual obligations attached to property are not subject to the principle of numerus clausus in property law. Nevertheless, granting the transferee-binding effect is an intervention in the parties’ private autonomy and freedom of contract. Therefore, any expansion of the objective scope of the transferee-binding effect must be grounded in existing regulations, identifying gaps between legislative intent and existing provisions before applying specific provisions by analogy. On one hand, the agreement on maintaining the condition of use and profit and penalty clauses should be granted the transferee-binding effect by analogy of the aforementioned provisions for contractual obligations attached to property. On the other hand, Articles 425(1) and 426-1 of Civil Code, which regulate “statutory contract assumption”, similarly impose the binding effect of others’ contractual relationships on transferees. As the land ownership is transferred, since both lease and superficies aim at usufructuary use of property for a specified period, the legislative purpose reflected in the “contract assumption” framework under Article 425(1) of Civil Code should likewise be fulfilled in the relationship between landowners and superficiaries. Hence, agreements objectively related to land use and ownership rights during the term of superficies should be granted the transferee-binding effect through the analogy of Article 425(1). The analogical application of Article 425(1) can freely coexist with the (analogical) application of provisions for contractual obligations attached to property. Nonetheless, in the case of transferring superficies, no legal loophole exists. Thus, there is no basis for making analogy of Article 426-1 of Civil Code.