情感如何安放於法律之中？—以人對非人動物之Compassion為例

Abstract

本文的研究對象為「情感」、「動物」，以及「法律」相互間的關係，並試圖論證情感存於法律之中的可能性及必要性，接著帶入動物倫理的議題，使得情感得以在法律之中，達到促進動物保護的實效。 首先，本文將於第二章進行法律與情感互動關係合宜性與必要性的證成，試圖建構出法律與情感的相互依賴基礎。並於本章之末，定錨於憐憫（Compassion）此特定類型之情感，以其作為情感與法律連結的前提性要件。 其次，第三章先進行動物倫理相關理論的基本介紹，並提出本文所採取的立場為動物福利論兼具能力進路。第二節開始，以Nussbaum理論為單向情感視角之例，將其對憐憫的相關論述，與對動物的能力清單進行分別論析，並將憐憫代入動物倫理的討論，使得兩個立論之間產生「鍵結」。 再者，第四章以Nussbaum情感的再延伸，將觸角伸及「雙向」情感的視角，不再如上述僅從人類對動物之單一視角談論憐憫，而是點出人類與動物之間憐憫所有的共情性與雙向模式。接著，再提出動物究竟有無法律上當事人適格的爭議，試圖構築出動物的主體性。不只是人對動物的憐憫之情，動物與人類之間相互產生的各式情感都因為互為主體，而該被一一看見。 最後，由上述三章綜合而論，可以推導出一個關於情感、法律與動物主體性的關聯。動物因為具有情感能力，因此具有主體性，也因此可以在法律中擁有主體地位的可能，而這就是情感在法律中的運用確實有其實益之處。

This study focuses on the interrelationship among “emotion,” “animals,” and “law,” aiming to demonstrate both the possibility and necessity of incorporating emotion into legal frameworks. Furthermore, it introduces the subject of animal ethics, arguing that the inclusion of emotion within legal reasoning can contribute meaningfully to the effective protection of animals. Chapter Two provides a justification for the appropriateness and necessity of integrating emotions into legal reasoning, thereby constructing a foundation for the mutual dependency between law and emotion. The chapter concludes by anchoring the discussion in a specific type of emotion—compassion—which will serve as a foundational element linking emotion and law. Chapter Three introduces fundamental theories of animal ethics and adopts a combined position of animal welfare and the capabilities approach. Beginning in Section Two, the discussion centers on Martha Nussbaum’s theory as an example of a one-directional emotional model. Her conceptualization of compassion and her list of central capabilities for animals are analyzed separately, and compassion is introduced into the context of animal ethics, thereby forging a conceptual “link” between the two. Chapter Four extends Nussbaum’s theory of emotion by introducing a “bidirectional” emotional perspective. Rather than examining compassion solely from the human-to-animal viewpoint, it highlights the mutual compassion and reciprocal emotional dynamics between humans and animals. This chapter further explores the legal debate regarding animals’ capacity to be recognized as legal subjects, aiming to construct a conception of animal subjectivity. Emotions are no longer regarded as exclusively human-directed toward animals; rather, the various emotional exchanges between humans and animals, grounded in intersubjectivity, deserve recognition. In sum, the integration of findings from the preceding three chapters reveals the interconnection among emotion, law, and animal subjectivity. The capacity of animals for emotion justifies their recognition as subjects, which in turn opens the possibility for their inclusion as legal subjects. This demonstrates that the incorporation of emotion into law is not only plausible but also normatively beneficial.