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  1. NTU Theses and Dissertations Repository
  2. 法律學院
  3. 科際整合法律學研究所
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/98276
Title: 董事自身利害關係之法制研究——以公司法第206條為中心
A Study on Directors' Conflicts of Interest: Focusing on Article 206 of the Company Act
Authors: 簡昕盈
Hsin-Ying Chien
Advisor: 蔡英欣
Ying-Hsin Tsai
Keyword: 忠實義務,自身利害關係,董事自我交易,關係人交易,
duty of loyalty,conflict of interest,self-dealing,related-party transactions,
Publication Year : 2025
Degree: 碩士
Abstract: 本論文旨在探討公司法第 206 條中有關董事於董事會決議中涉及自身利害關係時,應履行的揭露與表決迴避義務,並從忠實義務的觀點分析我國制度的運作與缺陷。董事身為公司之內部負責人,負有避免濫用職權以謀取私利之責任。然目前我國公司法關於何謂自身利害關係、揭露之時點與方式、表決迴避的標準等,均缺乏明確規範與統一見解,實務適用上亦產生諸多爭議。為釐清一制度的射程與功能,本文透過文獻分析與比較法研究,參考美國德拉瓦州公司法第 144 條、美國模範商業公司法與英國公司法等規範,檢視各國如何藉由資訊揭露、安全港條款與公平審查機制,防範董事利益衝突對公司造成損害。
相較於英美法上對董事忠實義務的具體化與責任劃分,我國公司法制度仍嫌簡略,欠缺對間接利害關係人與影子董事的有效規範;證券交易法為避免董事自肥之薪酬委員會設立成效也未可知。本文建議我國應強化董事對潛在利益衝突的主動說明義務、擴張利害關係判斷的適用範圍,建立具可操作性的程序規範,以提升董事會決策當性與公司治理品質,實現忠實義務保護公司利益的核心目標。
This thesis explores the procedural obligations of directors under Article 206 of Taiwan’s Company Act when they have conflicts of interest in board resolutions, with a focus on the duty to disclose and abstain from voting. As internal fiduciaries of the company, directors are obliged to avoid abusing their authority for personal gain.
However, the current legal framework in Taiwan lacks clear definitions and consistent standards regarding what constitutes a "conflict of interest," as well as when and how disclosure should be made and under what circumstances abstention is required. Through doctrinal analysis and comparative legal research, this study examines how jurisdictions such as Delaware (U.S.), the Model Business Corporation Act, and U.K. company law regulate conflict-of-interest transactions via disclosure obligations, safe harbor provisions, and fairness review mechanisms.
The study finds that Taiwan's regime remains overly simplistic compared to the more detailed fiduciary duty systems in common law jurisdictions, and it lacks effective regulations for indirect interested parties and shadow directors. Moreover, inconsistencies between the Company Act and the Securities and Exchange Act further complicate the disclosure requirements. This thesis recommends strengthening directors’ proactive disclosure duties and expanding the scope of interest determination. Such reforms would enhance the legitimacy of board decision-making and improve corporate governance, ultimately fulfilling the core objective of fiduciary duty—protecting the interests of the company.
URI: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/98276
DOI: 10.6342/NTU202502715
Fulltext Rights: 未授權
metadata.dc.date.embargo-lift: N/A
Appears in Collections:科際整合法律學研究所

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