論行政機關解釋法律的司法謙讓——以行政權民主正當性為中心

Abstract

在違憲審查領域廣為人知的「司法審查正當性」問題，是否亦應在行政法領域引發相應的問題意識與理論關懷？作為具有民主正當性的權力部門，行政機關所為之法律解釋，在受到司法審查時，是否值得受到一定程度的尊重？此一探問，自美國聯邦最高法院於1984年作成Chevron v. NRDC判決，確立「司法謙讓原則」以來，旋即成為美國學界與司法實務持續爭論的核心議題。在一向強調「法律保留」與「依法行政」的我國行政法體系中，是否可能且應當建立一套尊重行政機關法律解釋之司法審查標準？此即本文之核心研究目的。 為達成此一研究目的，本文首先完整爬梳美國司法謙讓原則之理論發展歷程，涵蓋其誕生之背景脈絡、對整體行政法秩序之影響、理論基礎之爭議，以及自2000年起所歷經之檢討與限縮，直至2024年聯邦最高法院於Loper Bright v. Raimondo案中正式推翻該原則時之論證轉向。奠基於此一系統性梳理，本文嘗試提出對美國司法謙讓原則較為妥適的理解視角與理論框架。本文指出，該原則之所以得以在美國法中發展形成，實係「法律解釋」概念自「法律發現」轉向「法律創造」的典範變遷結果。既然法律解釋不可避免地涉及政策判斷，則將此解釋權限適度保留予具民主正當性之權力部門優先行使，自有其理論上正當性。然而，美國多數學說與司法實務將此原則建立於「國會默示授權」的理論基礎之上，卻成為該原則發展受限與最終崩解之主要原因。本文因而主張，應自「行政權民主正當性」的權力分立視角出發，重構司法謙讓原則之理論基礎。 在此基礎上，本文進一步援引美國法上的行政權正當性理論模型，特別是Richard Stewart教授所提出之「專業模型」與「參與模型」，以及Elena Kagan教授所倡之「總統控制模型」，藉以詮釋聯邦最高法院於司法謙讓判例中之論述邏輯，並以之作為建構司法謙讓原則適用界限之理論平台。本文主張，司法謙讓原則之適用應以行政權民主正當性是否在憲政結構下已充分展現為判準，並據此提出形式與實質兩層面的適用界限。在形式界限上，本文認為行政解釋必須經過參與程序，或是足以彰顯總統控制與專業意見之均衡，方足以獲得司法謙讓。在實質界限上，本文首先檢討美國聯邦最高法院提出的主要問題原則(Major Question Doctrine)，並主張法院應自「質的區別」視角，辨析立法部門與行政部門民主正當性之異同，據此界定例外不得由行政部門單方形成之法律解釋事項。 最後，本文從行政法規範理念出發，比較美國與我國法之觀念差異，指出美國之所以有發展司法謙讓原則之制度條件，關鍵在於其以「二元民主」為基礎之權力分立體制；反觀我國，則因繼受德國「議會至上」的「一元民主」觀，而在法律保留、依法行政與法律明確性原則的漸次開展下，壓縮行政機關於法律解釋上之自主空間，進而形成以「司法優越」為基調之行政法體系。本文並發現，我國既有行政法體系忽略法律解釋內含之政策判斷與價值選擇，已於實踐中暴露出司法審查的「恣意」與「消極」面向。惟值得注意的是，考量到我國在修憲後，藉由總統民選及行政程序法的制定，已逐漸呈現「二元民主」的憲法變遷軌跡，本文據此主張，我國已具備適度鬆綁法律保留理念、發展司法謙讓原則之制度條件。在細緻識別美國與我國的若干制度差異後，本文進一步提出我國法院得以適用司法謙讓原則之判斷基準與適用界限，期能藉此促進行政權民主功能之實現，並試圖解決現行體制下所浮現之司法恣意與消極問題。

In the realm of constitutional adjudication, the legitimacy of judicial review has long been a central concern. Should a similar line of inquiry and theoretical engagement also arise in administrative law? Given that administrative agencies constitute a branch of government endowed with democratic legitimacy, should their interpretations of law receive a certain degree of judicial deference when subject to judicial review? Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, which established the doctrine of judicial deference, this question has become a focal point of sustained debate in American legal scholarship and judicial practice. Within Taiwan’s administrative law system—one that consistently emphasizes the principle of statutory reservation (Gesetzesvorbehalt)—is it possible, or indeed necessary, to develop a standard of judicial review that accords a degree of respect to agency statutory interpretation? This question forms the core purpose of this Article. To address this, the Article begins by systematically tracing the development of the judicial deference doctrine in the United States, including its historical background, institutional impact on the administrative law, theoretical foundations and controversies, and the doctrinal reconsiderations and limitations it has undergone since the 2000s, culminating in its formal overturning by the Supreme Court in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024). Based on this comprehensive review, the Article proposes a more suitable interpretive and theoretical framework for understanding the Chevron doctrine. It argues that the emergence of Chevron reflects a paradigmatic shift in the very concept of “statutory interpretation”—from a model of “law-finding” to one of “law-making.” Since statutory interpretation inevitably involves policy judgments, it is normatively justifiable to allocate primary interpretive authority to branches of government that is democratically accountable. However, the doctrine’s reliance on the theory of implicit congressional delegation has, paradoxically, become the principal reason for its eventual doctrinal decline. Accordingly, this Article contends that the theory of judicial deference should be reconstructed from a separation-of-powers perspective grounded in the democratic legitimacy of the executive branch. Based on this institutional lens, the Article further draws on models of administrative legitimacy in U.S. scholarship—specifically Richard Stewart’s “expertise model” and “participatory model,” as well as Elena Kagan’s “presidential control model”—to interpret the underlying logic of the Court’s Chevron jurisprudence. These models also serve as a theoretical platform for constructing the proper limits of judicial deference. The Article argues that the applicability of the deference doctrine should depend on whether democratic legitimacy has been sufficiently manifested under constitutional structure, and proposes a two-layered set of constraints: procedural and substantive. Procedurally, deference should be granted only where agency interpretation results from participatory processes or where there exists a balance between presidential control and professional expertise. Substantively, the Article analyzes the Major Questions Doctrine and proposes that courts distinguish between legislative and executive legitimacy through a qualitative distinction approach, identifying issues that should not be unilaterally resolved through agency interpretation. Finally, adopting a normative perspective rooted in administrative law theory, the Article compares the U.S. and Taiwanese systems and highlights that the development of judicial deference in the U.S. was made possible by its separation-of-powers framework grounded in “dual democracy.” By contrast, Taiwan—heavily influenced by German law’s “parliamentary supremacy” and “monolithic democracy”—has developed an administrative legal system that severely constrains agency interpretive autonomy through doctrines of statutory reservation, legality, and legislative clarity, resulting in a judicially dominant structure. The Article argues that this system has overlooked the value-laden and policy-driven nature of statutory interpretation, and in doing so has revealed both arbitrary and passive tendencies in judicial review. Nonetheless, in light of Taiwan’s post-constitutional reforms—such as the introduction of direct presidential elections and the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act—this Article contends that Taiwan is undergoing a constitutional shift toward dual democracy, thus providing institutional grounds for relaxing the rigidity of the statutory reservation doctrine and introducing a moderate model of judicial deference. After carefully identifying key institutional differences, the Article concludes by proposing specific criteria and boundaries for courts in Taiwan to adopt judicial deference, in hopes of enhancing the democratic function of the executive branch and addressing the problems of judicial arbitrariness and inertia.