臺灣半導體產業發展經驗：發展型國家理論之檢討

Abstract

本論文旨在探討臺灣政府於本土半導體產業之發展歷程中所扮演之角色。有別於過去研究大多以政府政策支持與產業發展成果之關聯性作為研究對象，而係以自主性為核心觀點切入，藉由觀察臺灣半導體產業不同發展階段中政府與產業之互動，剖析臺灣政府選擇介入之動機、介入之策略安排、實際介入之方式與最終之介入結果，並納入外在環境之因素，檢視政府如何介入及其之介入對於產業之效果，並分析產業界於政府政策擬定與執行過程中之角色，同時了解對產業發展結果造成實質影響之事物，以全面釐清政府介入之邏輯與自主性程度，從而檢討發展型國家理論於解釋臺灣半導體產業發展之適用性。 而本論文之研究發現，臺灣半導體產業之發展主要係由產業力量主導政府進行政策介入。產業發展前期因缺乏本土半導體技術之人才與專業知識，因此技術官僚與政治菁英選擇採用內部產業菁英所提出之發展策略，後期則因本土產業已建立且茁壯，在其充沛之影響力下，政府選擇配合外部產業界主動提倡之政策建議。同時，臺灣政府執行半導體產業政策之結果，不僅會受民間企業基於其自身商業利益為考量之態度左右外，亦存在著國內外政治經濟情勢之變數，為政策成效帶來不可預期之正面或負面影響。另外，產業規模大小並不一定造成政府主導能力之減弱，政策內容是否符合企業利益，方為產業選擇配合政府支配之關鍵。是以，當政府之介入動機與政策決策範圍，受制於產業界之提案與倡議，以及過程中無法有效控制私部門配合參與，甚至是遭受到其積極之反制，凸顯出實際上臺灣政府僅具有限之自主性，仍係由產業扮演主導角色，進而挑戰典型發展型國家之政府具有領導與支配之權威地位之主張。

This study explores the role of Taiwan’s government in developing its domestic semiconductor industry. Departing from previous research that primarily focused on the correlation between state policy support and industrial development outcomes, it adopts a perspective centered on autonomy. By examining government-industry interactions across different stages of development, the study analyzes the motives, strategies, modalities, and consequences of governmental intervention. It also incorporates external factors to assess how the government intervened and the effects of its actions. Furthermore, the study examines the industry’s role in shaping and implementing state policy and identifies key factors that substantially influence industrial development. This comprehensive approach aims to clarify the logic of state intervention and the degree of state autonomy, thereby re-evaluating the applicability of the theory of developmental state in explaining Taiwan’s semiconductor industry development. The findings suggest that the development of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry was primarily driven by industrial actors who guided the direction of policy intervention. In the early stages, a lack of domestic expertise led technocrats and political elites to adopt strategies proposed by internal industry elites. As the industry matured and gained influence, the government increasingly responded to policy proposals advocated by external industrial forces. Policy outcomes were influenced not only by the commercial interests of private firms but also by evolving domestic and global political-economic conditions, producing both anticipated and unexpected effects. The scale of the industry did not necessarily erode the government’s leadership capacity; instead, industrial cooperation hinged on the alignment between policy content and corporate interests. Thus, when state motivations and policy scope were steered by industrial advocacy, and the government failed to effectively secure private-sector cooperation or faced active resistance, the limited autonomy of Taiwan’s government became evident. These dynamics underscore the dominant role of industry and challenge the core assumption of the theory of developmental state that presumes strong state authority and control.