伊斯蘭國家的宗教少數歧視： 國家能力與宗教籠絡

Abstract

本文探討了為什麼一些穆斯林佔多數的國家在提高制度化的宗教籠絡後會經歷對非穆斯林宗教少數群體的歧視增加，而其他國家則不會。本文假設，宗教籠絡對非穆斯林宗教少數群體歧視的影響是由國家能力所調節的。我們的研究發現，當國家擁有更高的基礎建設、行政能力時，更有可能滿足宗教籠絡下的宗教行動者對宗教合法性壟斷的需求，隨著宗教籠絡制度化程度的加強，導致對非穆斯林宗教少數族群的歧視的增加。相反，當政權缺乏國家能力，縱使宗教籠絡制度化程度的提高，因為穿透社會能力的不足，不會出現相應的歧視增加現象。值得注意的是，這一關係在來自穆斯林佔多數的國家的樣本中得到了觀察，突顯了穆斯林佔多數的威權國家中，宗教壟斷合法化的獨特角色，並且在特定脈絡下，非穆斯林宗教少數群體的存在成為政權為了鞏固多數宗教社群的支持，透過籠絡多數宗教社群的宗教行動者作為交換，以此犧牲非穆斯林宗教少數群體的平等權利。這項研究通過闡明對宗教多數社群的宗教籠絡如何影響對宗教少數群體的反應，為該領域做出了貢獻。

This paper investigates why some Muslim-majority countries with high levels of religious co-optation experience increased discrimination against non-Muslim religious minorities, while others do not. It posits that the effect of religious co-optation on minority discrimination is moderated by the state capacity — infrastructure power of a particular regime. Our findings reveal that when the regime has higher state capacity, they are more likely to satisfy the demands from co-opted religious majority groups for religious legitimacy monopolies, leading to increased non-Muslim religious minority discrimination as religious co-optation intensifies. In contrast, when the regime lacks state capacity, they meet the circumstances of insufficient penetration capabilities to meet these demands and implement restriction regulation policies and thus show no corresponding increase in discrimination. Notably, this relationship is observed in samples from Muslim-majority countries, highlighting the unique context of religious monopoly legitimation desire from the co-opted group, and state-established discrimination policies toward the mere existence of non-Muslim religious minorities, as an expense trade-off to continue secure the support from co-opted religious majority group which they are indispensable for regime survival. This research contributes to the field by delineating how the responses to non-Muslim religious minorities are shaped by the structural conditions that authoritarian leaders face.