《論語》「親親互隱」重探 ——兼論如何面對他人的過失

Abstract

近代以降，儒學的孝弟思想被批評為中國人徇情枉法、缺乏公德的文化思想根據。批評者認為儒學將家庭倫理視為道德正當性的根據和最高原則，導致人們無條件地順從父母，當親情與公義產生衝突時，選擇維護親情而犧牲公義。《論語》所記載的「親親互隱」一般認為是親情與公義相衝突的典型案例，近十年來更成為儒學研究者爭論的熱點。

本論文根據道德難題產生的不同因素作為分類框架，將學者對於親親互隱的爭論分為三類難題來處理。首先是「事實性難題」，這是由學者對於字詞理解的分歧所造成的難題。筆者根據《論語》語詞用法和思想主張斷定「隱藏說」是文本原意，並且隱藏親人罪行並不等同於默許或縱容親人犯罪。其次是「規範性難題」，這是由不同道德規範之間的衝突所造成的道德困境。無論是批評或為孔子辯護，多數學者皆認為孔子主張親親互隱是為了「直：親人真實的情感」而妥協公義的問題。然而，筆者根據《論語》特定句式的語意邏輯和對於德行價值流於弊端的反思，指出親親互隱的主導價值規範並不是「直」，而是「禮」和「學」，並且沒有捨棄是非公義。再者是「根源性難題」，是由學者對於倫理基礎的合理性爭議所構成的。學者基於認為孔子主張親親互隱就是高舉親情過於公義，從而斷定親情就是孔子思想的正當性根源和至高原則。批評者認為以親情為道德正當性的根據和至高原則，會導致道德倫理陷入特殊主義和相對主義；辯護者則認為人們無法憑空習得普遍的道德原則，特殊具體的親人關係是人們認識與實踐普遍價值的必要條件。然而，筆者根據《論語》孝弟思想是受到是非判斷的約束，並且只是士人次等的德行，指出孝弟不是孔子思想的最高原則和一切行為正當性的根據。筆者認為學者對於親親互隱的誤解，不僅是因為對孔子孝思想的掌握不夠全面，也是因為忽略了孔子在面對他人過失時異於常人的道德分辨與追求。

In modern times, Confucian filial piety and fraternal respect have been criticized as cultural ideologies in China that prioritize family relations over legal justice and public morality. Critics argue that Confucianism treats family ethics as the basis and supreme principle of moral legitimacy, leading people to unconditionally obey their parents. When conflicts arise between familial emotions and justice, individuals tend to prioritize familial bonds at the expense of justice. The “concealment of family faults” described in the Analects is generally seen as a classic case where familial emotions conflict with justice, and has become a hotly debated topic among Confucian scholars in recent decades.

This thesis categorizes scholars' debates on “concealment of family faults” into three types of ethical dilemmas based on different factors contributing to moral quandaries. First is the “factual dilemma”, arising from scholars’ divergent interpretations of words and phrases. Based on an analysis of linguistic usage and philosophical assertions in the Analects, the author concludes that the “concealment theory” represents the text's original intent, asserting that hiding familial wrongdoings does not equate to condoning or tolerating them. Second is the “normative dilemma”, stemming from conflicts between different moral standards. Most scholars, whether critiquing or defending Confucius, agree that his advocacy of concealing faults among kin compromises justice in favor of preserving genuine familial emotions. However, the author argues, based on specific syntactical semantics in the Analects and reflections on the pitfalls of ethical virtues, that the dominant normative value guiding “concealment of family faults” is not merely “genuine emotions” but rather “ritual propriety” and “learning”, without forsaking judgments of right and wrong. Third is the “foundational dilemma”, arising from disputes among scholars over the rationality of ethical foundations. Some scholars assert that Confucius elevates familial emotions above justice, viewing familial bonds as the legitimate basis and supreme principle of his ethical thought. Critics argue that grounding moral legitimacy in familial emotions leads to moral relativism and particularism. Defenders counter that universal moral principles cannot be learned in isolation from specific familial relationships, which are necessary conditions for understanding and practicing universal values. However, the author contends that Confucian filial piety and fraternal respect are subject to judgments of right and wrong and are not the highest principles or the sole basis for moral legitimacy in Confucian thought. The author concludes that misunderstandings of the concept of concealing family faults stem not only from an incomplete grasp of Confucius’s filial piety but also from a failure to recognize Confucius’s unique moral discernment and pursuit in addressing others' faults.