一個新的自由意志與道德責任的來源相容論式觀點

Abstract

本篇論文的目的是探索一種新的來源相容論（source compatibilism）。此計畫分為三個階段：建立來源式觀點、為相容論辯護，以及形式化我的理論。在第一部分，我發展了一個可以避免傳統「封鎖案例（blockage cases）」以及其他「富蘭克福式案例（Frankfurt-style cases）」所受到的挑戰的新版封鎖案例。我利用這個新版封鎖案例來否定一個版本的PAP：PAP+；並以此論證來源式觀點的合理性。在第二部分，做為對相容論的辯護，我發展了一個對Alfred R. Mele的受精卵論證（zygote argument）的回應。我論證就算一個行為者是被一個崇高存在有意圖地創造的，他仍然可以自由且須負道德責任地行動。在最後部分，立基於我在前兩部分的發現，我提出了一種新的來源相容論；它具有一個核心條件：實際控制條件（actual-control condition）。

This thesis explores a new type of source compatibilism. The project is divided into three main parts: establishing the source view, defending compatibilism, and formulating my theory. In the first part, I develop a new type of blockage case which does not suffer from objections that traditional blockage cases and Frankfurt-style cases in general face. By this new blockage case, I argue for the falsity of a version of PAP, PAP+, and thus establish the plausibility of the source view. In the second part, I develop a reply to Alfred R. Mele’s zygote argument, as a defense of compatibilism. I argue that even if an agent were intentionally designed by a supreme being, the agent could still be free and morally responsible for his actions. In the final part, I propose a new type of source compatibilism with a core condition, the actual-control condition, which is based on my findings from the first two parts.