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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 鄧敦民 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Duen-Min Deng | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 詹遠至 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author | Yuan-Chih Chan | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-08-15T17:03:24Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2024-08-16 | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2024-08-15 | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2024 | - |
| dc.date.submitted | 2024-08-04 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | Ayer, A. J. (1954). Freedom and necessity. In Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 271-284.
Copp, David (2003). ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’, Blameworthiness, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. pp. Fischer, John Martin (1994). The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control. Cambridge, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell. Fischer, John Martin (1999). Recent work on moral responsibility. Ethics 110 (1):93-139. Fischer, John Martin (2006). My way: essays on moral responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. Fischer, John Martin & Ravizza, Mark (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza. Frankfurt, Harry G. (1969). Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839. Frankfurt, Harry G. (1971). Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20. Ginet, Carl (1996). In defense of the principle of alternative possibilities: Why I don't find Frankfurt's argument convincing. Philosophical Perspectives 10:403-17. Haji, Ishtiyaque (1998). Moral appraisability: puzzles, proposals, and perplexities. New York: Oxford University Press. Hunt, David P. (2000). Moral responsibility and unavoidable action. Philosophical Studies 97 (2):195-227. Hunt, David (2003). Freedom, foreknowledge, and Frankfurt. In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. pp. 159--183. Hunt, David P. (2005). Moral responsibility and buffered alternatives. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):126-145. Kane, Robert (1996). The Significance of Free Will. New York, US: Oxford University Press USA. Kane, Robert (2000). Responses to Bernard Berofsky, John Martin Fischer and Galen Strawson. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):157-167. Kane, Robert (2003). Responsibility, indeterminism and Frankfurt-style cases: A reply to Mele and Robb. In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. pp. 91-105. Lewis, David K. (1976). The Paradoxes of Time Travel. American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (2):145-152. McKenna, Michael S. (1997). Alternative Possibilities and the Failure of the Counterexample Strategy. Journal of Social Philosophy 28 (3):71-85. McKenna, Michael S. (2001). Source incompatibilism, ultimacy, and the transfer of non-responsibility. American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1):37-51. McKenna, Michael S. (2013). Reasons-Responsiveness, Agents, and Mechanisms. In Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 1. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 151-183. Mele, Alfred R. (2006). Free Will and Luck. New York, US: Oxford University Press. Mele, Alfred R. (2013). Manipulation, Moral Responsibility, and Bullet Biting. The Journal of Ethics 17 (3):167-184. Mele, Alfred R. (2019). Manipulated Agents: A Window to Moral Responsibility. New York, NY: Oup Usa. Mele, Alfred R. & Robb, David (1998). Rescuing Frankfurt-style cases. Philosophical Review 107 (1):97-112. Otsuka, Michael (1998). Incompatibilism and the avoidability of blame. Ethics 108 (4):685-701. Pereboom, Derk (2000). Alternative possibilities and causal histories. Philosophical Perspectives 14 (s14):119-138. Pereboom, Derk (2001). Living Without Free Will. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pereboom, Derk (2003). Source incompatibilism and alternative possibilities. In Michael S. McKenna & David Widerker (eds.), Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. pp. 184--199. Pereboom, Derk (2014). Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. New York: Oxford University Press. Rocca, Michael Della (1998). Frankfurt, Fischer and flickers. Noûs 32 (1):99-105. Sartorio, Carolina (2016). Causation and Free Will. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK. Stump, Eleonore (1988). Sanctification, hardening of the heart, and Frankfurt's concept of free will. Journal of Philosophy 85 (8):395-420. Stump, Eleonore (1996). Libertarian freedom and the principle of alternative possibilities. In Jeff Jordan & Daniel Howard-Snyder (eds.), Faith, Freedom, and Rationality: Philosophy of Religion Today. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield. pp. 73-88. Van Inwagen, Peter (1983). An Essay on Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. Widerker, David (1995). Libertarianism and Frankfurt's attack on the principle of alternative possibilities. Philosophical Review 104 (2):247-61. Widerker, David (2000). Frankfurt's attack on the principle of alternative possibilities: A further look. Philosophical Perspectives 14 (s14):181-202. Widerker, David (2003). Blameworthiness and Frankfurt's argument against the principle of alternative possibilities. In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. pp. 53-73. Widerker, David & McKenna, Michael (eds.) (2003). Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. Wolf, Susan R. (1990). Freedom Within Reason. New York: Oup Usa. Wyma, Keith (1997). Moral Responsibility and Leeway for Action. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):57 - 70. | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/94363 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本篇論文的目的是探索一種新的來源相容論（source compatibilism）。此計畫分為三個階段：建立來源式觀點、為相容論辯護，以及形式化我的理論。在第一部分，我發展了一個可以避免傳統「封鎖案例（blockage cases）」以及其他「富蘭克福式案例（Frankfurt-style cases）」所受到的挑戰的新版封鎖案例。我利用這個新版封鎖案例來否定一個版本的PAP：PAP+；並以此論證來源式觀點的合理性。在第二部分，做為對相容論的辯護，我發展了一個對Alfred R. Mele的受精卵論證（zygote argument）的回應。我論證就算一個行為者是被一個崇高存在有意圖地創造的，他仍然可以自由且須負道德責任地行動。在最後部分，立基於我在前兩部分的發現，我提出了一種新的來源相容論；它具有一個核心條件：實際控制條件（actual-control condition）。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This thesis explores a new type of source compatibilism. The project is divided into three main parts: establishing the source view, defending compatibilism, and formulating my theory. In the first part, I develop a new type of blockage case which does not suffer from objections that traditional blockage cases and Frankfurt-style cases in general face. By this new blockage case, I argue for the falsity of a version of PAP, PAP+, and thus establish the plausibility of the source view. In the second part, I develop a reply to Alfred R. Mele’s zygote argument, as a defense of compatibilism. I argue that even if an agent were intentionally designed by a supreme being, the agent could still be free and morally responsible for his actions. In the final part, I propose a new type of source compatibilism with a core condition, the actual-control condition, which is based on my findings from the first two parts. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Submitted by admin ntu (admin@lib.ntu.edu.tw) on 2024-08-15T17:03:24Z No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2024-08-15T17:03:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | Chapter 1 Introduction: Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Alternative Possibilities 1
1.1 Free Will and Alternative Possibilities 1 1.2 Free Will and Moral Responsibility 3 1.3 Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities 4 Chapter 2 The Defenses of PAP, and the Replies to Them 8 2.1 The Flicker Defense 8 2.2 The Dilemma Defense 12 2.3 Blockage to Rescue? 14 2.3.1 The Blockage Cases 14 2.3.2 Objections to the Blockage Cases 17 2.3.3 The Last Hope for Blockage? 21 Chapter 3 A New Type of Blockage Case 28 3.1 The Illuminated Way 28 3.2 Developing a New Type of Blockage Case 29 3.3 PAP or PAP+? 33 3.4 Conclusion 39 Chapter 4 Toward the Source Compatibilism 41 4.1 Preliminaries 41 4.2 Pereboom’s Four-case Argument 43 4.3 Mele’s Zygote Argument 52 4.4 Replying to the Zygote Argument 55 4.4.1 Overlapping Control 56 4.4.2 The Adaptability of Control 61 4.4.3 Explaining Away the Intuition 67 4.4.4 Summing Up 70 4.5 Conclusion 71 Chapter 5 A New Source Compatibilism 72 5.1 Foreword 72 5.2 Ernie and the Reasons-responsive Theory 72 5.3 Lessons from Tim 74 5.4 A New Source Compatibilism 76 5.5 Closing Remarks 81 References 82 | - |
| dc.language.iso | en | - |
| dc.title | 一個新的自由意志與道德責任的來源相容論式觀點 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | A New Source Compatibilist View of Free Will and Moral Responsibility | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | - |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 112-2 | - |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | - |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 王鵬翔;王一奇 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Peng-Hsiang Wang;Linton I-Chi Wang | en |
| dc.subject.keyword | 自由意志,道德責任,來源相容論,富蘭克福式案例,其他可能性原則,受精卵論證,控制, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | free will,moral responsibility,source compatibilism,Frankfurt-style cases,principle of alternative possibilities,zygote argument,control, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 85 | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202402273 | - |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | - |
| dc.date.accepted | 2024-08-07 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 文學院 | - |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 哲學系 | - |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 哲學系 | |
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