買賣契約不可抗力條款之研究 ─以晶片貿易制裁為中心

Abstract

臺灣是半導體製造業的先進聚集地，鄰近其他亞洲國家，例如日本、中國、韓國也都致力於半導體產業發展。美國提出晶片法案，透過補助與相應措施來發展美國本土的半導體產業，以防止美國的半導體業務轉移至中國。對台灣而言，這項法案也有助於降低半導體供應鏈風險，並防止中國可能對臺灣的封鎖或入侵造成的影響。然而，該法案在設計上存在不足之處，可能使半導體供應鏈造成無法達到預計產能的目標，甚至削弱臺灣作為半導體核心產業的地位，進而對臺灣的安全構成威脅。目前的半導體行業由全球各地的專業製造公司主導，台灣積體電路製造股份有限公司是其中一個主要生產高端晶片的公司，其他半導體生態系統中的重要組成部分還包括設計晶片(美國公司AMD、Nvidia和Qualcomm)、專業製造微影設備(荷蘭公司ASML)、生產晶片製造設備(日本公司東京電子)、以及提供用於設計晶片軟體服務 (英國公司Arm)。 透過上述專業化的生態系，可以說明全球供應鏈中每個部分都能分工明確並改進其所擅長的領域，從而提升整體供應鏈的健全發展，使該產業更能韌性的應對震盪的局勢。儘管這個問題並非臺灣獨有，但供應鏈的各個環節皆可能成為國際貿易上的瓶頸。 在國際貿易頻繁的情況下，跨國契約的訂立條款變為至關重要。本文討論了晶片法案導致之貿易制裁是否屬於不可抗力與人為因素的概念，尤其和貿易制裁最相關之政府行為，進一步討論美國、中國和台灣契約上不可抗力和情事變更之概念和在契約簽訂時如何立定不可抗力條款。對於雙方訂立晶片交易契約時，必須提前考慮企業經濟環境、交易風險等，以此來審視契約與不可抗力條款的訂定，已達成衡平當事人間權益並減少可能產生的損失。

Taiwan plays a critical role in the semiconductor manufacturing professions worldwide. The soundness of laws and policies across countries is a determinant in safeguarding and advancing global business communication and trades in semiconductor industries. Due to the appealing investment and business conditions (e.g., lowered labor costs, huge markets) of China, numerous semiconducting corporations have migrated from the US to China over the past decades. To address this concern, the US has introduced the Chip Act in 2022 to reduce migration in this regard and foster its domestic semiconductor industries through subsidies and corresponding measures. While this Act helps reduce the risks faced in the semiconductor supply chain, mitigating potential business and political concerns from China, it may hinder Taiwan’s supply chains from meeting its intended production capacity, potentially harming Taiwan’s standing as a key contributor and player in the global semiconductor market shares with increased security apprehensions. The division of labor and expertise representing the collaborative efforts in semiconductor industries and supply chains have formed a robust ecosystem to withstand market fluctuations and challenges over the years. For example, from the specialized lithography equipment manufacturers (e.g., ASML in the Netherlands), semiconductor equipment producers (e.g., Tokyo Electron in Japan) to chip-design software service providers (e.g., ARM in the UK), chip designers (e.g., AMD, Nvidia, Qualcomm in the US), and high-end chip producers (e.g., TSMC in Taiwan). Well-founded development of international trade contractual terms is fundamental to the coordination and prosperity of semiconductor manufacturing industries and cross-border commerce in the long run. As challenges in different segments of the supply chain could cause threats or bottlenecks in international trade detrimental to involved countries, including Taiwan, it is of high importance to leverage potential risk factors, such as economic conditions or transaction uncertainty, when entering semiconductor contracts. This paper aims to discuss whether the Chip Act-induced trade sanctions fall under the concept of force majeure or human factors. It will also examine how force majeure clauses should be established at the time of formalizing the agreement. By closely exploring the establishment of contact and force majeure clauses, we hope to mitigate potential losses, achieve a balance of interests between the parties, and optimize transnational collaborations. With frequent international trade, the international sales contract is an important key. This article discusses whether the trade sanctions caused by the Chip Act are applicable to the concept of force majeure and further discusses the establishment of government acts in force majeure clauses when signing sales or relate contracts. The parties to the contract must first consider the economic environment of the enterprise and future transaction risks. When entering into a chip transaction contract, how to review the contract and the accurate wording for the force majeure clause can balance the rights and interests between the parties and reduce possible future losses.