論機構投資人與公司治理－以股利分派為中心

Abstract

本論文研究機構投資人在現代公司治理架構中的角色演變，尤其著眼於股東提案股利分派案、臨時動議案及公司章程授權董事會股利分派對公司的影響。近年來隨著台灣資本市場的深化發展，機構投資人的持股比例與影響力顯著提升，這一趨勢為公司法與公司治理實務帶來了新的挑戰與機遇。 本論文首先梳理了我國近年來有關股利分派的重要案例與股東提案，對107年公司法修正前後的法律框架進行了比較分析，並整理機構投資人與投票顧問機構在股利分派政策揭露之內容及其對股利分派之態度。本研究進而以美國法作為比較法研究的主要參照，同時整理國際公司治理組織對股利分派議題的立場，以及機構投資人在不同法域中所扮演的角色差異，試圖為台灣公司治理的發展提供更為全面的理論基礎和實踐指引。 本文認為股利分派權限的合理劃分應當遵循「共享權限」原則，無論是盈餘配息還是公積配息均應納入股利分派的範疇。具體而言，股利分派議案應由董事會提出，再交由股東會承認，而本文主張這一程序應確實適用於股東提案權與臨時動議提案等情形。儘管機構投資人的影響力日益增強，但依現行公司法規範，機構投資人仍無法輕易透過股東提案權與臨時動議提案影響股利分派決策。

This thesis studies the evolving role of institutional investors in modern corporate governance, particularly examining the impact of shareholder proposals for dividend distribution, extemporary motions, and corporate charter provisions authorizing board-determined dividends. In recent years, as Taiwan's capital market has deepened, the shareholding ratio and influence of institutional investors have significantly increased, bringing new challenges and opportunities to corporate law and governance practices. This thesis begins by reviewing important cases and shareholder proposals related to dividend distribution in Taiwan in recent years. It provides a comparative analysis of the legal framework before and after the 2018 amendment to the Company Act and compiles the disclosure content of institutional investors and proxy advisors regarding dividend distribution policies as well as their attitudes towards dividend distribution. From a comparative law perspective, it primarily references U.S. law while also examining the positions of international corporate governance organizations on dividend distribution issues and the varying roles of institutional investors across different jurisdictions. Through this approach, this article aims to provide a more comprehensive theoretical foundation and specific guidance for the development of corporate governance in Taiwan. This thesis argues that the allocation of dividend distribution authority should follow the principle of "shared authority" between the shareholders’ meetings and board of directors. Both earnings distribution and capital surplus distribution should be considered as dividend distribution, while dividend distribution proposals should be put forward by the board of directors and then approved by the shareholders' meeting. This procedure should also apply to shareholder proposals and extemporary motions at shareholders' meetings. Despite the increasing influence of institutional investors, under current corporate law regulations, they still cannot easily influence dividend distribution decisions through shareholder proposals and extemporary motions.