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標題: | 私法債權與憲法財產權 -以債權作為民法第184條第1項前段之保護標的為例 Obligatory Rights of Private Law and Constitutional Property Rights |
作者: | 黃奕華 I-Hua Huang |
指導教授: | 林明昕 Ming-Hsin Lin |
關鍵字: | 債權侵害,侵權行為,憲法財產權,既得利益,基本權第三人效力,保護不足禁止, infringement of obligatory rights,tort law,constitutional property rights,vested interests,third person application of constitutional rights,prohibition of inadequate protection, |
出版年 : | 2023 |
學位: | 碩士 |
摘要: | 關於債權是否為民法第184條第1項前段的保護客體,由於債權和物權同樣受到憲法第15條財產權保障,故此一爭議應有自憲法觀點加以分析之必要。
為了避免財產權保障的浮濫與稀釋,以及考量財產權和私法自治的明確界分,僅有「既得利益」始為憲法財產權之保護範圍,而「取得利益之機會」則以客觀法原則之私法自治作為保障機制,此即憲法對於財產利益的二元保護模式。準此,在財產權內容仰賴法律形成的觀點下,民法所形塑之私法債權係以「請求力」與「保持力」為其權利內涵,則債權人請求給付的「權利地位」以及保有基於債權「已取得之給付利益」,具備利益之既得性,應為財產權之射程所及。相反地,「尚未取得之給付利益」,鑒於債權並非對於給付行為或給付客體的支配,其無從獲致憲法第15條財產權條款的保護。 基於「修正的主觀法多層論」,本文主張憲法和民法係共同構成市民社會生活領域之基本決定,基本權亦有被私人侵害之可能。是以,既然憲法保護之債權亦具有民法權利之性格,學理上所討論的債權侵害類型中,「侵害債權歸屬」與「侵害債權標的致債務人免給付義務」已侵害債權人權利地位,「侵害以債權為占有本權的有權占有」則屬侵害債權人本於債權已取得之給付利益,均已損及憲法財產權之保護領域。又因上述案型為既得利益之干預,不僅和市場自由競爭無涉,行為人通常亦具較高之預見可能性,而和物權侵害具類似性,不應為區別對待。縱使部分案例行為人較難知悉債權之存在,以權利之性質作為得否適用民法第184條第1項前段之分類標準,亦顯然涵蓋過廣。因此,受憲法保護之債權應被視為侵權行為法之權利,否則將違反平等原則之要求,悖於「保護不足禁止」的憲法誡命。 Regarding whether the obligatory rights is protected as the object of protection under the forepart of Article 184 Paragraph 1 of the Civil Code, due to both obligatory rights and property rights being protected by Article 15 of the Constitution, it is necessary to analyze this dispute from a constitutional perspective. In order to prevent the excessive expansion and dilution of constitutional property rights, as well as to ensure a clear distinction between property rights and private autonomy, the protection scope of constitutional property rights is limited to "vested interests" only. On the other hand, the "opportunity to acquire interests" is protected through the mechanism of private autonomy based on objective legal principles. This constitutes the dual protection model of property interests under the Constitution. In accordance with the perspective that the content of constitutional property rights is constructed by law, obligatory rights of private law which formed by civil law is characterized by the rights of "claiming" and "retention" as its substantive rights. Therefore, the "rights position" of the creditor's claim for payment and the retention of the "received benefits" based on the obligatory rights possess the quality of vested interest and should fall within the scope of constitutional property rights. On the contrary, the "benefits not yet acquired" do not fall under the protection of Article 15 of the Constitution since the creditor's rights do not have control over the act of payment or the object of payment. Based on the "modified subjective multilayered theory", this paper argues that the Constitution and civil law together constitute the fundamental decisions in the sphere of civil society life, and that constitutional rights may be infringed by private individuals. Therefore, since the obligatory rights protected by the Constitution also possess the characteristics of rights under civil law, within the theoretical discussions on types of infringement of obligatory rights, the infringements of "attribution of infringement to the attribution rights" and "resulting release of the debtor from the obligation to make payment" have already violated the rights position of the creditor. The infringement of "rightful possession based on the obligatory rights as a right of possession" constitutes an infringement of the obligatory rights concerning the benefits already received through the obligatory rights. All of these infringements have encroached upon the protection domain of constitutional property rights. Furthermore, as the aforementioned case involves intervention in vested interests, it not only has no relation to free market competition but also often exhibits a higher degree of foreseeability on the part of the actor. Similar to property rights infringements, it should not be treated differently. Even though in some cases it may be difficult for the actor to become aware of the existence of the obligatory rights, using the nature of the rights as the classification criterion for the applicability of the forepart of Article 184 Paragraph 1 of the Civil Code appears to be overly broad. Therefore, the obligatory rights protected by the Constitution should be regarded as rights under tort law. Otherwise, it would violate the requirement of the principle of equality and go against the constitutional command of "prohibition of inadequate protection". |
URI: | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/88165 |
DOI: | 10.6342/NTU202301670 |
全文授權: | 同意授權(全球公開) |
顯示於系所單位: | 法律學系 |
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