管理階層薪酬與年紀是否影響併購價格分攤？以財務 會計準則第141 號、142 號公報為例

Abstract

本研究針對美國財務會計準則141 號公報「企業合併」及142 號公報「商譽與其他無形資產」規範下，探討CEO 是否會透過高估併購價格分攤入商譽及無耐用年限之無形資產以增加其獎酬，及較年長之CEO 是否會利用高估併購價格分攤入商譽及無形資產以實行盈餘管理，進而增加短期績效表現。本研究以美國2002 至2020 年併購公司為樣本，發現在財務會計準則第141 號及142 號公報規範下，有較高獎酬及較年長之CEO 傾向分攤較多併購交易金額入商譽及無耐用年限之無形資產。顯示該公報規範下，擁有較高獎酬及較年長之CEO 傾向透過高估商譽價值，使併購價格並無依其價值認列，降低併購後費用產生並使盈餘高估，商譽亦失去與未來現金流相關的資訊價值

In 2001, the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) alleged Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 141, “Business Combination.” and SFAS No. 142, “Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets.” This research aims to explore whether the CEOs will overvalue goodwill and intangible assets with infinite life through purchase price allocation (PPA) and whether the older CEOs will use the overvalued goodwill and intangible assets to implement earnings management, and then Increase short-term performance under the regime of SFAS 141, SFAS142. From a sample of US companies conducting mergers and acquisitions during 2002-2020, I found that older CEOs and CEOs with higher bonuses tend to allocate more purchase price to goodwill and Intangible assets with infinite life. It shows that under the regime of SFAS 141, and SFAS 142, older CEOs and CEOs with higher bonuses reduced post-acquisition expenses and overestimated the post-acquisition earnings by overvaluing goodwill, to embellish their performance and inflate total compensation. Moreover, Goodwill also loses its informative value of future cash flow for the acquirers.