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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 王全三 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.advisor | Chuan-San Wang | en |
dc.contributor.author | 薛宇軒 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author | Yu-Hsuan Hsueh | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-08-08T16:10:00Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-11-09 | - |
dc.date.copyright | 2023-08-08 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2023 | - |
dc.date.submitted | 2023-07-10 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Adut, D., W. H. Cready, and T. J. Lopez. 2003. Restructuring charges and CEO cash compensation: A reexamination. The Accounting Review 78 (1):169-192.
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/88071 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 本研究針對美國財務會計準則141 號公報「企業合併」及142 號公報「商譽與其他無形資產」規範下,探討CEO 是否會透過高估併購價格分攤入商譽及無耐用年限之無形資產以增加其獎酬,及較年長之CEO 是否會利用高估併購價格分攤入商譽及無形資產以實行盈餘管理,進而增加短期績效表現。本研究以美國2002 至2020 年併購公司為樣本,發現在財務會計準則第141 號及142 號公報規範下,有較高獎酬及較年長之CEO 傾向分攤較多併購交易金額入商譽及無耐用年限之無形資產。顯示該公報規範下,擁有較高獎酬及較年長之CEO 傾向透過高估商譽價值,使併購價格並無依其價值認列,降低併購後費用產生並使盈餘高估,商譽亦失去與未來現金流相關的資訊價值 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | In 2001, the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) alleged Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 141, “Business Combination.” and SFAS No. 142, “Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets.” This research aims to explore whether the CEOs will overvalue goodwill and intangible assets with infinite life through purchase price allocation (PPA) and whether the older CEOs will use the overvalued goodwill and intangible assets to implement earnings management, and then Increase short-term performance under the regime of SFAS 141, SFAS142. From a sample of US companies conducting mergers and acquisitions during 2002-2020, I found that older CEOs and CEOs with higher bonuses tend to allocate more purchase price to goodwill and Intangible assets with infinite life. It shows that under the regime of SFAS 141, and SFAS 142, older CEOs and CEOs with higher bonuses reduced post-acquisition expenses and overestimated the post-acquisition earnings by overvaluing goodwill, to embellish their performance and inflate total compensation. Moreover, Goodwill also loses its informative value of future cash flow for the acquirers. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Submitted by admin ntu (admin@lib.ntu.edu.tw) on 2023-08-08T16:10:00Z No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2023-08-08T16:10:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 誌謝 III
中文摘要 IV 英文摘要 V 1. INTRODUCTION 1 2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 5 2.1. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 5 2.2. PRIOR RESEARCH 6 2.2.1. Accounting Discretion Under SFAS141 7 2.2.2. Accounting Discretion Under SFAS142 8 2.2.3. Management compensation incentive for earning management. 9 2.2.4. The relation between the age of CEOs and earnings management 11 2.3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 11 3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND VARIABLE MEASUREMENT ..................................................................... 14 3.1. RESEARCH DESIGN FOR H1 AND H2 14 3.2. VARIABLE MEASUREMENT FOR H1 AND H2 15 4. SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS. 18 4.1. SAMPLE SELECTION 18 4.2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTIC 21 5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 25 6. ROBUSTNESS TESTS AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 27 6.1 ROBUSTNESS TEST 27 6.2 ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 28 7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 30 | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.title | 管理階層薪酬與年紀是否影響併購價格分攤?以財務 會計準則第141 號、142 號公報為例 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Do the CEO’s compensation and age influence the Purchase Price Allocation? The evidence from SFAS 141、142 | en |
dc.type | Thesis | - |
dc.date.schoolyear | 111-2 | - |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | - |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 王維康;林修葳 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | Wei-Kang Wang;Hsiou-Wei Lin | en |
dc.subject.keyword | 併購價格分攤,無形資產評價,盈餘管理,管理階層行為,管理階層獎酬結構, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Earnings management,Purchase price allocation,management behaviors,management compensation structure,intangible asset valuation, | en |
dc.relation.page | 35 | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202301137 | - |
dc.rights.note | 未授權 | - |
dc.date.accepted | 2023-07-12 | - |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | - |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學系 | - |
顯示於系所單位: | 會計學系 |
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